22 USC 9752 - Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft

Collapse to view only § 9752. Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft

§ 9751. Developing and implementing a coordinated sanctions strategy with partners in the Western Hemisphere and the European Union
§ 9752. Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft
§ 9753. Countering Russian influence in Venezuela
§ 9754. Restriction on export of covered articles and services to certain security forces of Venezuela

§ 9751. Developing and implementing a coordinated sanctions strategy with partners in the Western Hemisphere and the European Union

(a) Strengthening sanctions capacity in Latin America and the Caribbean

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall offer to provide technical assistance to partner governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to assist such governments in establishing the legislative and regulatory frameworks needed to impose targeted sanctions on officials of the Maduro regime who—

(1) are responsible for human rights abuses;

(2) have engaged in public corruption; or

(3) are undermining democratic institutions and processes in Venezuela.

(b) Coordinating international sanctions

Not later than 90 days after December 20, 2019, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsection (a) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(5) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(d) Authorization of appropriations

(1) In general

(2) Notification requirements

(Pub. L. 116–94, div. J, title I, § 161, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 3040.)

§ 9752. Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft

(a) Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in this section as “PDVSA”), through a no compete transaction, secured a loan from Russian government-controlled oil company Rosneft, using 49.9 percent of PDVSA’s American subsidiary, CITGO Petroleum Corporation, including its assets in the United States, as collateral. As a result of this transaction, 100 percent of CITGO is held as collateral by PDVSA’s creditors.

(2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA, is engaged in interstate commerce and owns and controls critical energy infrastructure in 19 States of the United States, including an extensive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refineries, with a combined oil refining capacity of 749,000 barrels per day. CITGO’s refinery in Lake Charles, Louisiana, is the sixth largest refinery in the United States.

(3) The Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Rosneft, which is controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation, and its Executive Chairman, Igor Sechin, following Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.

(4) The Department of Homeland Security has designated the energy sector as critical to United States infrastructure.

(5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela raises the probability that the Maduro regime and PDVSA will default on their international debt obligations, resulting in a scenario in which Rosneft could come into control of CITGO’s United States energy infrastructure holdings.

(b) Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) control of critical United States energy infrastructure by Rosneft, a Russian government-controlled entity currently under United States sanctions that is led by Igor Sechin, who is also under United States sanctions and is a close associate of Vladimir Putin, would pose a significant risk to United States national security and energy security; and

(2) a default by PDVSA on its loan from Rosneft, resulting in Rosneft coming into possession of PDVSA’s United States CITGO assets, would warrant careful consideration by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.

(d) Security risk report

Not later than 90 days after December 20, 2019, the President shall submit a report assessing the national security risks posed by potential Russian acquisition and control of CITGO’s United States energy infrastructure holdings to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(5) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(Pub. L. 116–94, div. J, title I, § 163, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 3041.)

§ 9753. Countering Russian influence in Venezuela

(a) Short title

(b) Threat assessment and strategy to counter Russian influence in Venezuela

(1) Defined term

In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) Threat assessment

Not later than 120 days after December 20, 2019, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding—

(A) an assessment of Russian-Venezuelan security cooperation;

(B) the potential threat such cooperation poses to the United States and countries in the Western Hemisphere; and

(1) Aliens described

(2) Visas, admission, or parole

An alien described in paragraph (1) is—

(A) inadmissible to the United States;

(B) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(C) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(3) Current visas revoked

(A) In general

(B) Immediate effect

A revocation under subparagraph (A) shall—

(i) take effect immediately; and

(ii) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.

(4) Exceptions

Sanctions under paragraphs (2) and (3) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—

(A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations; or

(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(5) National security

The President may waive the application of this subsection with respect to an alien if the President—

(A) determines that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States; and

(B) submits a notice of, and justification for, such waiver to the appropriate congressional committees.

(6) Sunset

(Pub. L. 116–94, div. J, title I, § 165, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 3043.)

§ 9754. Restriction on export of covered articles and services to certain security forces of Venezuela

(a) Short title

(b) DefinitionsIn this section:

(1) Appropriate congressional committeesThe term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(D) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(2) Covered article or serviceThe term “covered article or service”—

(A) for purposes of subsection (c), means—

(i) a defense article or defense service (as such terms are defined in section 2794 of this title); and

(ii) any article included on the Commerce Control List set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations under subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, and controlled for crime control purposes, if the end user is likely to use the article to violate the human rights of the citizens of Venezuela; and

(B) for purposes of subsection (d), means—

(i) any defense article or defense service of the type described in section 2794 of this title; and

(ii) any article of the type included on the Commerce Control List set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations and controlled for crime control purposes.

(3) Foreign person

(4) Person

(5) Security forces of VenezuelaThe term “security forces of Venezuela” includes—

(A) the Bolivarian National Armed Forces, including the Bolivarian National Guard;

(B) the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service;

(D) the Bureau for Scientific, Criminal and Forensic Investigations of the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace.

(6) United States personThe term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

(1) In general

(2) DeterminationNot later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the heads of other departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall—

(A) determine, using such information that is available to the Secretary of State, whether any covered article or service has been transferred since July 2017 to the security forces of Venezuela without a license or other authorization as required by law; and

(B) submit such determination in writing to the appropriate congressional committees.

(d) Report

(1) In general

(2) Matters to be includedThe report required under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) a list of all significant transfers by foreign persons of covered articles or services to such elements of the security forces of Venezuela since July 2017;

(B) a list of all foreign persons who maintain an existing defense relationship with such elements of the security forces of Venezuela; and

(C) any known use of covered articles or services by such elements of the security forces of Venezuela or associated forces, including paramilitary groups, that have coordinated with such security forces to assault, intimidate, or murder political activists, protesters, dissidents, and other civil society leaders, including Juan Guaidó.

(e) SunsetThis section shall terminate on the earlier of—

(1) the date that is 3 years after December 20, 2019; or

(2) the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Venezuela has returned to a democratic form of government with respect for the essential elements of representative democracy as set forth in Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted by the Organization of American States in Lima on September 11, 2001.

(Pub. L. 116–94, div. J, title I, § 166, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 3044.)