- § 3361. Strategy to respond to influence and information operations targeting Taiwan
- § 3362. Task force to counter economic coercion by the People’s Republic of China
- § 3363. China censorship monitor and action group
§ 3361. Strategy to respond to influence and information operations targeting Taiwan
(a) In generalNot later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—
(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s “United Front” work related to Taiwan, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and
(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.
(b) ElementsThe strategy required under subsection (a) shall include descriptions of—
(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People’s Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—
(A) assistance in building the capacity of Taiwan’s public and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;
(B) assistance to enhance Taiwan’s ability to develop a holistic strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and
(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;
(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;
(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations; and
(4) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda.
(Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5513, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3309.)
§ 3362. Task force to counter economic coercion by the People’s Republic of China
(a) Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) increasing use of economic coercion against foreign governments, companies, organizations, other entities, and individuals requires that the United States devise a comprehensive, effective, and multilateral response;
(2) the private sector is a crucial partner in helping the United States Government respond to the PRC’s coercive economic practices and hold the PRC accountable;
(3) improved engagement and communication with the private sector, including receiving information from the United States private sector about the PRC’s coercive economic practices would help the United States Government and private sector stakeholders conduct early assessments of potential pressure points and vulnerabilities; and
(4) PRC coercive economic practices create pressures for the private sector to behave in ways antithetical to United States national interests and competitiveness.
(b) Establishment of Task Force
(c) Duties
(1) In generalThe Task Force shall—
(A) oversee the development and implementation of an integrated United States Government strategy to respond to People’s Republic of China (PRC) coercive economic practices, which shall include—
(i) systematically monitoring and evaluating—(I) the costs of such practices on United States businesses and overall United States economic performance;(II) instances in which such practices taken against a non-PRC entity has benefitted other parties; and(III) the impacts such practices have had on United States national interests; and
(ii) facilitating coordination among Federal departments and agencies when responding to such practices as well as proactively deterring such economic coercion, including by clarifying the roles for Federal departments and agencies identified in subsection (d) in implementing the strategy; and
(iii) forming policy recommendations for the implementation of relevant United States authorities to respond to instances of PRC coercive economic practices;
(B) consult with United States allies and partners on the feasibility and desirability of collectively identifying, assessing, and responding to PRC coercive economic practices, as well as actions that could be taken to expand coordination with the goal of ensuring a consistent, coherent, and collective response to such practices and establishing long-term deterrence of such practices;
(C) effectively engage the United States private sector, particularly sectors, groups, or other entities that are susceptible to such PRC coercive economic practices, on concerns related to such practices; and
(D) develop and implement a process for regularly sharing relevant information, including classified information to the extent appropriate and practicable, on such PRC coercive economic practices with United States allies, partners, and the private sector.
(2) ConsultationIn carrying out its duties under this subsection, the Task Force should regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with the following:
(A) Relevant stakeholders in the private sector.
(B) Federal departments and agencies that are not represented on the Task Force.
(C) United States allies and partners.
(d) MembershipThe President shall—
(1) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Security Council;
(2) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Economic Council; and
(3) determine the Federal departments and agencies that will serve on the task force, and direct the head of those agencies to appoint personnel at the level of Assistant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force.
(e) Reports
(1) Initial reportNot later than 1 year after December 23, 2022, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements:
(A) A comprehensive review of the array of economic tools the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) employs or could employ in the future to coerce other governments and non-PRC companies (including United States companies) including the Government of the PRC’s continued efforts to codify informal practices into its domestic law.
(B) The strategy required by subsection (c)(1)(A).
(C) An interagency definition of PRC coercive economic practices that captures both—
(i) the use of informal or extralegal PRC coercive economic practices; and
(ii) the inappropriate use of economic tools, including those authorized under the laws and regulations of the PRC.
(D) A comprehensive review of the array of tools the United States Government employs or could employ to respond to economic coercion against the government, companies, and other entities of the United States or its allies and partners.
(E) A list of unilateral or multilateral—
(i) preemptive practices to defend or deter against PRC coercive economic practices; and
(ii) actions taken in response to the Government of the PRC’s general use of coercive economic practices, including the imposition of costs on the PRC.
(F) An assessment of United States allies and partners key vulnerabilities to PRC coercive economic practices.
(G) A description of gaps in existing resources or capabilities for United States Government departments and agencies to respond effectively to PRC coercive economic practices directed at United States entities and assist United States allies and partners in their responses to PRC coercive economic practices.
(H) An analysis of the circumstances under which the PRC employs different types of economic coercion and against what kinds of targets.
(I) An assessment of United States and international rules and norms as well as any treaty obligations the PRC has stretched, circumvented, or broken through its economically coercive practices and the United States response in each instance.
(2) Interim reports
(A) First interim reportNot later than 1 year after the date on which the report required by paragraph (1) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements:
(i) Updates to information required by subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (1).
(ii) A description of activities conducted by the Task Force to implement the strategy required by subsection (c)(1)(A).
(iii) An assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of the strategy, lessons learned from the past year and planned changes to the strategy.
(B) Second interim report
(3) Final reportNot later than 30 days after the date on which the report required by paragraph (2)(B) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a final report that includes the following elements:
(A) An analysis of PRC coercive economic practices and the cost of such coercive practices to United States businesses.
(B) A description of areas of possible vulnerability for United States businesses and businesses of United States partners and allies.
(C) Recommendations on how to continue the effort to counter PRC coercive economic practices, including through further coordination with United States allies and partners.
(D) Illustrative examples.
(4) Form
(f) Sunset
(1) In general
(2) Additional actions
(g) Assistance for countries and entities targeted by the People’s Republic of China for economic coercion
(Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5514, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3310.)
§ 3363. China censorship monitor and action group
(a) DefinitionsIn this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committeesThe term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Qualified research entityThe term “qualified research entity” means an entity that—
(A) is a nonpartisan research organization or a Federally funded research and development center;
(B) has appropriate expertise and analytical capability to write the report required under subsection (c); and
(C) is free from any financial, commercial, or other entanglements, which could undermine the independence of such report or create a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest, with—
(i) the Government of the People’s Republic of China;
(ii) the Chinese Communist Party;
(iii) any company incorporated in the People’s Republic of China or a subsidiary of such company; or
(iv) any company or entity incorporated outside of the People’s Republic of China that is believed to have a substantial financial or commercial interest in the People’s Republic of China.
(3) United States personThe term “United States person” means—
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
(b) China Censorship Monitor and Action Group
(1) In general
(2) MembershipThe President shall take the following actions with respect to the membership of, and participation in, the Task Force:
(A) Appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Security Council.
(B) Appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Economic Council.
(C) Determine the Federal departments and agencies that will serve on the Task Force, and direct the head of those agencies to appoint personnel at the level of Assistant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force.
(3) ResponsibilitiesThe Task Force shall—
(A) oversee the development and execution of an integrated Federal Government strategy to monitor and address the impacts of efforts directed, or directly supported, by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to censor or intimidate, in the United States or in any of its possessions or territories, any United States person, including United States companies that conduct business in the People’s Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech; and
(B) submit the strategy developed pursuant to subparagraph (A) to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 120 days after December 23, 2022.
(4) Meetings
(5) ConsultationsThe Task Force should regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with—
(A) Federal agencies that are not represented on the Task Force;
(B) independent agencies of the United States Government that are not represented on the Task Force;
(C) relevant stakeholders in the private sector and the media; and
(D) relevant stakeholders among United States allies and partners facing similar challenges related to censorship or intimidation by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(6) Reporting requirements
(A) Annual reportThe Task Force shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes, with respect to the reporting period—
(i) the strategic objectives and policies pursued by the Task Force to address the challenges of censorship and intimidation of United States persons while in the United States or any of its possessions or territories, which is directed or directly supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China;
(ii) the activities conducted by the Task Force in support of the strategic objectives and policies referred to in clause (i); and
(iii) the results of the activities referred to in clause (ii) and the impact of such activities on the national interests of the United States.
(B) Form of report
(C) Congressional briefings
(c) Report on censorship and intimidation of United States persons by the Government of the People’s Republic of China
(1) Report
(A) In general
(B) Matters to be includedThe report required under subparagraph (A) shall—
(i) assess major trends, patterns, and methods of the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to direct or directly support censorship and intimidation of United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People’s Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech;
(ii) assess, including through the use of illustrative examples, as appropriate, the impact on and consequences for United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People’s Republic of China, that criticize—(I) the Chinese Communist Party;(II) the Government of the People’s Republic of China;(III) the authoritarian model of government of the People’s Republic of China; or(IV) a particular policy advanced by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People’s Republic of China;
(iii) identify the implications for the United States of the matters described in clauses (i) and (ii);
(iv) assess the methods and evaluate the efficacy of the efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to limit freedom of expression in the private sector, including media, social media, film, education, travel, financial services, sports and entertainment, technology, telecommunication, and internet infrastructure interests;
(v) include policy recommendations for the United States Government, including recommendations regarding collaboration with United States allies and partners, to address censorship and intimidation by the Government of the People’s Republic of China; and
(vi) include policy recommendations for United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in China, to address censorship and intimidation by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(C) Applicability to United States allies and partners
(2) Submission of report
(A) In general
(B) Publication
(d) Sunset
(Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5515, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3313.)