1. U.S. Code
  2. title 50
  3. chapter 42
  4. subchapter II
  5. part A
  6. § 2538d

Collapse to view only § 2538d. Incorporation of integrated surety architecture

§ 2521. Stockpile stewardship program
(a) EstablishmentThe Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator, shall establish a stewardship program to ensure—
(1) the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and certification; and
(2) that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing.
(b) Program elementsThe program shall include the following:
(1) An increased level of effort for advanced computational capabilities to enhance the simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with respect to the performance over time of nuclear weapons.
(2) An increased level of effort for above-ground experimental programs, such as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, plasma physics, and materials research.
(3) Support for new facilities construction projects that contribute to the experimental capabilities of the United States, such as an advanced hydrodynamics facility, the National Ignition Facility, and other facilities for above-ground experiments to assess nuclear weapons effects.
(4) Support for the use of, and experiments facilitated by, the advanced experimental facilities of the United States, including—
(A) the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
(B) the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory;
(C) the Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories; and
(D) the experimental facilities at the Nevada National Security Site.
(5) Support for the sustainment and modernization of facilities with production and manufacturing capabilities that are necessary to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including—
(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and
(B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national security laboratories.
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4201, formerly Pub. L. 103–160, div. C, title XXXI, § 3138, Nov. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1946; Pub. L. 105–85, div. C, title XXXI, § 3152(e), Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 2042; renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4201, by Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(e)(2), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1758; Pub. L. 111–84, div. C, title XXXI, § 3111, Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2702; Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3131(b), (bb)(1)(C), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2180, 2185; Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, § 3146(c)(1), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1073.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2521

§ 2522. Stockpile stewardship criteria
(a) Requirement for criteria
(b) Coordination with Secretary of Defense
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4202, formerly Pub. L. 105–261, div. C, title XXXI, § 3158, Oct. 17, 1998, 112 Stat. 2257; Pub. L. 106–65, div. A, title X, § 1067(3), Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 774; renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4202, by Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(e)(3), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1758; Pub. L. 111–84, div. C, title XXXI, § 3112, Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2703; Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3133(b)(1), (2), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2192.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2522

§ 2523. Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and responsiveness plan
(a) Plan requirement
(b) Submissions to Congress
(1) In accordance with subsection (c), not later than March 15 of each even-numbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a summary of the plan developed under subsection (a).
(2) In accordance with subsection (d), not later than March 15 of each odd-numbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a detailed report on the plan developed under subsection (a).
(3) The summaries and reports required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Elements of biennial plan summaryEach summary of the plan submitted under subsection (b)(1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(1) A summary of the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each warhead type.
(2) A summary of the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead types.
(3) A summary of the methods and information used to determine that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable, as well as the relationship of science-based tools to the collection and interpretation of such information.
(4) A summary of the status of the nuclear security enterprise, including programs and plans for infrastructure modernization and retention of human capital, as well as associated budgets and schedules.
(5) A summary of the status, plans, and budgets for carrying out the stockpile responsiveness program under section 2538b of this title.
(6) A summary of the plan regarding the research and development, deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of technologies described in subsection (d)(7).
(7) A summary of the assessment under subsection (d)(8) regarding the execution of programs with current and projected budgets and any associated risks.
(8) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).
(9) Such other information as the Administrator considers appropriate.
(d) Elements of biennial detailed reportEach detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(2) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(1) With respect to stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, and stockpile responsiveness—
(A) the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each warhead type;
(B) for each five-year period occurring during the period beginning on the date of the report and ending on the date that is 20 years after the date of the report—
(i) the planned number of nuclear warheads (including active and inactive) for each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(ii) the past and projected future total lifecycle cost of each type of nuclear weapon;
(C) the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead types;
(D) a description of the process by which the Administrator assesses the lifetimes, and requirements for life extension or replacement, of the nuclear and non-nuclear components of the warheads (including active and inactive warheads) in the nuclear weapons stockpile;
(E) a description of the process used in recertifying the safety, security, and reliability of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile;
(F) any concerns of the Administrator that would affect the ability of the Administrator to recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile (including active and inactive warheads);
(G) mechanisms to provide for the manufacture, maintenance, and modernization of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile, as needed;
(H) mechanisms to expedite the collection of information necessary for carrying out the stockpile management program required by section 2524 of this title, including information relating to the aging of materials and components, new manufacturing techniques, and the replacement or substitution of materials;
(I) mechanisms to ensure the appropriate assignment of roles and missions for each national security laboratory and nuclear weapons production facility, including mechanisms for allocation of workload, mechanisms to ensure the carrying out of appropriate modernization activities, and mechanisms to ensure the retention of skilled personnel;
(J) mechanisms to ensure that each national security laboratory has full and complete access to all weapons data to enable a rigorous peer-review process to support the annual assessment of the condition of the nuclear weapons stockpile required under section 2525 of this title;
(K) mechanisms for allocating funds for activities under the stockpile management program required by section 2524 of this title, including allocations of funds by weapon type and facility;
(L) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the program required under section 2524 of this title;
(M) the status, plans, activities, budgets, and schedules for carrying out the stockpile responsiveness program under section 2538b of this title;
(N) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the program required under section 2538b of this title; and
(O) as required, when assessing and developing prototype nuclear weapons of foreign countries, a report from the directors of the national security laboratories on the need and plan for such assessment and development that includes separate comments on the plan from the Secretary of Energy and the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) With respect to science-based tools—
(A) a description of the information needed to determine that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable;
(B) for each science-based tool used to collect information described in subparagraph (A), the relationship between such tool and such information and the effectiveness of such tool in providing such information based on the criteria developed pursuant to section 2522(a) of this title; and
(C) the criteria developed under section 2522(a) of this title (including any updates to such criteria).
(3) An assessment of the stockpile stewardship program under section 2521(a) of this title by the Administrator, in consultation with the directors of the national security laboratories, which shall set forth—
(A) an identification and description of—
(i) any key technical challenges to the stockpile stewardship program; and
(ii) the strategies to address such challenges without the use of nuclear testing;
(B) a strategy for using the science-based tools (including advanced simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of nuclear testing;
(C) an assessment of the science-based tools (including advanced simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory that exist at the time of the assessment compared with the science-based tools expected to exist during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program; and
(D) an assessment of the core scientific and technical competencies required to achieve the objectives of the stockpile stewardship program and other weapons activities and weapons-related activities of the Administration, including—
(i) the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians, by discipline, required to maintain such competencies; and
(ii) a description of any shortage of such individuals that exists at the time of the assessment compared with any shortage expected to exist during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program.
(4) With respect to the nuclear security infrastructure—
(A) a description of the modernization and refurbishment measures the Administrator determines necessary to meet the requirements prescribed in—
(i) the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent national security strategy report of the President under section 3043 of this title if such strategy has been submitted as of the date of the plan;
(ii) the most recent national defense strategy as of the date of the plan; and
(iii) the most recent Nuclear Posture Review as of the date of the plan;
(B) a schedule for implementing the measures described under subparagraph (A) during the 10-year period following the date of the plan;
(C) the estimated levels of annual funds the Administrator determines necessary to carry out the measures described under subparagraph (A), including a discussion of the criteria, evidence, and strategies on which such estimated levels of annual funds are based; and
(D)
(i) a description of—(I) the metrics (based on industry best practices) used by the Administrator to determine the infrastructure deferred maintenance and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and(II) the percentage of replacement plant value being spent on maintenance and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and
(ii) an explanation of whether the annual spending on such needs complies with the recommendation of the National Research Council of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine that such spending be in an amount equal to four percent of the replacement plant value, and, if not, the reasons for such noncompliance and a plan for how the Administrator will ensure facilities of the nuclear security enterprise are being properly sustained.
(5) With respect to the nuclear test readiness of the United States—
(A) an estimate of the period of time that would be necessary for the Administrator to conduct an underground test of a nuclear weapon once directed by the President to conduct such a test;
(B) a description of the level of test readiness that the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines to be appropriate;
(C) a list and description of the workforce skills and capabilities that are essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site;
(D) a list and description of the infrastructure and physical plants that are essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site; and
(E) an assessment of the readiness status of the skills and capabilities described in subparagraph (C) and the infrastructure and physical plants described in subparagraph (D).
(6) A strategy for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile stewardship needs over a 20-year period that includes the following:
(A) An assessment of the baseline science issues necessary to understand plutonium aging under static and dynamic conditions under manufactured and nonmanufactured plutonium geometries.
(B) An assessment of scientific and testing instrumentation for plutonium at elemental and bulk conditions.
(C) An assessment of manufacturing and handling technology for plutonium and plutonium components.
(D) An assessment of computational models of plutonium performance under static and dynamic loading, including manufactured and nonmanufactured conditions.
(E) An identification of any capability gaps with respect to the assessments described in subparagraphs (A) through (D).
(F) An estimate of costs relating to the issues, instrumentation, technology, and models described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) over the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program under section 2453 of this title.
(G) An estimate of the cost of eliminating the capability gaps identified under subparagraph (E) over the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program.
(H) Such other items as the Administrator considers important for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile stewardship needs.
(7) A plan for the research and development, deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of the technologies employed within the nuclear security enterprise to address physical and cyber security threats during the five fiscal years following the date of the report, together with—
(A) for each site in the nuclear security enterprise, a description of the technologies deployed to address the physical and cybersecurity threats posed to that site;
(B) for each site and for the nuclear security enterprise, the methods used by the Administration to establish priorities among investments in physical and cybersecurity technologies; and
(C) a detailed description of how the funds identified for each program element specified pursuant to paragraph (1) in the budget for the Administration for each fiscal year during that five-fiscal-year period will help carry out that plan.
(8) An assessment of whether the programs described by the report can be executed with current and projected budgets and any associated risks.
(9) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).
(e) Nuclear Weapons Council assessment
(1) For each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(2), the Nuclear Weapons Council shall conduct an assessment that includes the following:
(A) An analysis of the plan, including—
(i) whether the plan supports the requirements of the national security strategy of the United States referred to in subsection (d)(4)(A)(i), the most recent the national defense strategy, and the most recent Nuclear Posture Review;
(ii) whether the modernization and refurbishment measures described under subparagraph (A) of subsection (d)(4) and the schedule described under subparagraph (B) of such subsection are adequate to support such requirements; and
(iii) whether the plan supports the stockpile responsiveness program under section 2538b of this title in a manner that meets the objectives of such program and an identification of any improvements that may be made to the plan to better carry out such program.
(B) An analysis of whether the plan adequately addresses the requirements for infrastructure recapitalization of the facilities of the nuclear security enterprise.
(C) If the Nuclear Weapons Council determines that the plan does not adequately support modernization and refurbishment requirements under subparagraph (A) or the nuclear security enterprise facilities infrastructure recapitalization requirements under subparagraph (B), a risk assessment with respect to—
(i) supporting the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(ii) maintaining the long-term safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(2) Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Administrator submits the plan under subsection (b)(2), the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report detailing the assessment required under paragraph (1).
(f) DefinitionsIn this section:
(1) The term “budget”, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31.
(2) The term “future-years nuclear security program” means the program required by section 2453 of this title.
(3) The term “national defense strategy” means the review of the defense programs and policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 113(g) of title 10.
(4) The term “nuclear security budget materials”, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials submitted to Congress by the Administrator in support of the budget for that fiscal year.
(5) The term “weapons activities” means each activity within the budget category of weapons activities in the budget of the Administration.
(6) The term “weapons-related activities” means each activity under the Department of Energy that involves nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons technology, or fissile or radioactive materials, including activities related to—
(A) nuclear nonproliferation;
(B) nuclear forensics;
(C) nuclear intelligence;
(D) nuclear safety; and
(E) nuclear incident response.
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4203, formerly Pub. L. 105–85, div. C, title XXXI, § 3151, Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 2041; renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4203, by Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(e)(4), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1758; amended Pub. L. 108–375, div. C, title XXXI, § 3115, Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 2162; Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3133(a)(1), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2187; Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, §§ 3123, 3146(a)(2)(A), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1061, 1072; Pub. L. 113–291, div. C, title XXXI, § 3142(c), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3900; Pub. L. 114–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3112(c)(1), Nov. 25, 2015, 129 Stat. 1190; Pub. L. 115–91, div. C, title XXXI, §§ 3111(c), 3133(c)(1), 3134, 3135(a), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1882, 1896, 1898; Pub. L. 116–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3139(b)(2), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1962.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2523

§ 2523a. Repealed. Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3133(c)(1), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2192

CITE AS: 50 USC 2523a

§ 2523b. Transferred

CITE AS: 50 USC 2523b

§ 2523c. Major warhead refurbishment program
In fiscal year 2015 and subsequent fiscal years, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees (as defined in U.S.C. 101(a)(16) 1
1 So in original. Probably should be “10 U.S.C. 101(a)(16)”.
) a report, on each major warhead refurbishment program that reaches the Phase 6.3 milestone, that provides an analysis of alternatives. Such report shall include—
(1) a full description of alternatives considered prior to the award of Phase 6.3;
(2) a comparison of the costs and benefits of each of those alternatives, to include an analysis of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives against each alternative considered;
(3) identification of the cost and risk of critical technology elements associated with each alternative, including technology maturity, integration risk, manufacturing feasibility, and demonstration needs;
(4) identification of the cost and risk of additional capital asset and infrastructure capabilities required to support production and certification of each alternative;
(5) a comparative analysis of the risks, costs, and scheduling needs for any military requirement intended to enhance warhead safety, security, or maintainability, including any requirement to consolidate and/or integrate warhead systems or mods as compared to at least one other feasible refurbishment alternative the Nuclear Weapons Council considers appropriate; and
(6) a life-cycle cost estimate for the alternative selected that details the overall cost, scope, and schedule planning assumptions.
(Pub. L. 113–235, div. D, title III, § 308, Dec. 16, 2014, 128 Stat. 2324.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2523c

§ 2524. Stockpile management program
(a) Program requiredThe Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a program, in support of the stockpile stewardship program, to provide for the effective management of the weapons in the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the extension of the effective life of such weapons. The program shall have the following objectives:
(1) To increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States.
(2) To further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing.
(3) To achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(4) To reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of an element of the stockpile.
(5) To reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a person or entity hostile to the United States, its vital interests, or its allies.
(b) Program limitationsIn carrying out the stockpile management program under subsection (a), the Secretary of Energy shall ensure that—
(1) any changes made to the stockpile shall be made to achieve the objectives identified in subsection (a); and
(2) any such changes made to the stockpile shall—
(A) remain consistent with basic design parameters by including, to the maximum extent feasible, components that are well understood or are certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing; and
(B) use the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the nuclear security enterprise to fulfill current mission requirements of the existing stockpile.
(c) Program budget
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4204, formerly Pub. L. 106–65, div. C, title XXXI, § 3133, Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 926; renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4204, and amended Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, §§ 3111, 3141(e)(5), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1743, 1758; Pub. L. 111–84, div. C, title XXXI, § 3113(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2704; Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3133(d), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2192; Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, § 3146(c)(2), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1073.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2524

§ 2524a. Repealed. Pub. L. 111–84, div. C, title XXXI, § 3113(a)(1), Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2704

CITE AS: 50 USC 2524a

§ 2525. Annual assessments and reports to the President and Congress regarding the condition of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile
(a) Annual assessments required
(b) Covered officials
(1) The head of each national security laboratory.
(2) The Commander of the United States Strategic Command.
(c) Dual validation teams in support of assessmentsIn support of the assessments required by subsection (a), the Administrator may establish teams, known as “dual validation teams”, to provide each national security laboratory responsible for weapons design with independent evaluations of the condition of each warhead for which such laboratory has lead responsibility. A dual validation team established by the Administrator shall—
(1) be comprised of weapons experts from the laboratory that does not have lead responsibility for fielding the warhead being evaluated;
(2) have access to all surveillance and underground test data for all stockpile systems for use in the independent evaluations;
(3) use all relevant available data to conduct independent calculations; and
(4) pursue independent experiments to support the independent evaluations.
(d) Use of teams of experts for assessmentsThe head of each national security laboratory shall establish and use one or more teams of experts, known as “red teams”, to assist in the assessments required by subsection (a). Each such team shall include experts from both of the other national security laboratories. Each such team for a national security laboratory shall—
(1) review both the matters covered by the assessments under subsection (a) performed by the head of that laboratory and any independent evaluations conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c);
(2) subject such matters to challenge; and
(3) submit the results of such review and challenge, together with the findings and recommendations of such team with respect to such review and challenge, to the head of that laboratory.
(e) Report on assessmentsNot later than December 1 of each year, each official specified in subsection (b) shall submit to the Secretary concerned, and to the Nuclear Weapons Council, a report on the assessments that such official was required by subsection (a) to complete. The report shall include the following:
(1) The results of each such assessment.
(2)
(A) Such official’s determination as to whether or not one or more underground nuclear tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified in the assessments and, if so—
(i) an identification of the specific underground nuclear tests that are necessary to resolve such issues; and
(ii) a discussion of why options other than an underground nuclear test are not available or would not resolve such issues.
(B) An identification of the specific underground nuclear tests which, while not necessary, might have value in resolving any such issues and a discussion of the anticipated value of conducting such tests.
(C) Such official’s determination as to the readiness of the United States to conduct the underground nuclear tests identified under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B), if directed by the President to do so.
(3) In the case of a report submitted by the head of a national security laboratory—
(A) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods, including with respect to cyber assurance, being used to determine the matters covered by the assessments;
(B) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the tools and methods employed by the manufacturing infrastructure required by section 2532 of this title to identify and fix any inadequacy with respect to the matters covered by the assessments, and the confidence of the head in such tools and methods;
(C) a concise summary of the findings and recommendations of any teams under subsection (d) that relate to the assessments, together with a discussion of those findings and recommendations;
(D) a concise summary of the results of any independent evaluation conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c); and
(E) a concise summary of any significant finding investigations initiated or active during the previous year for which the head of the national security laboratory has full or partial responsibility.
(4) In the case of a report submitted by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command—
(A) a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types;
(B) a summary of all major assembly releases in place as of the date of the report for the active and inactive nuclear weapon stockpiles; and
(C) the views of the Commander on the stockpile responsiveness program under section 2538b of this title, the activities conducted under such program, and any suggestions to improve such program.
(5) An identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the capability of the official submitting the report to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessments.
(f) Submittals to the President and Congress
(1) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the President—
(A) each report, without change, submitted to either Secretary under subsection (e) during the preceding year;
(B) any comments that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate with respect to each such report;
(C) the conclusions that the Secretaries individually or jointly reach as to the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; and
(D) any other information that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate.
(2) Not later than March 15 of each year, the President shall forward to Congress the matters received by the President under paragraph (1) for that year, together with any comments the President considers appropriate.
(3) If the President does not forward to Congress the matters required under paragraph (2) by the date required by such paragraph, the officials specified in subsection (b) shall provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees not later than March 30 on the report such officials submitted to the Secretary concerned under subsection (e).
(g) Classified form
(h) DefinitionIn this section, the term “Secretary concerned” means—
(1) the Secretary of Energy, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Energy; and
(2) the Secretary of Defense, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense.
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4205, formerly div. C, title XXXI, § 3141, Dec. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 2730; renumbered div. D, title XLII, § 4205, and amended Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(e)(6), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1759; Pub. L. 111–84, div. C, title XXXI, § 3114(a)(2)–(d), Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2706, 2707; Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3131(c), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2180; Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, §§ 3122, 3146(c)(3), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1061, 1074; Pub. L. 113–291, div. C, title XXXI, § 3142(d), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3900; Pub. L. 114–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3112(d), Nov. 25, 2015, 129 Stat. 1191; Pub. L. 117–81, div. C, title XXXI, § 3133, Dec. 27, 2021, 135 Stat. 2230.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2525

§ 2526. Form of certifications regarding the safety or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile

Any certification submitted to the President by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy regarding confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type in the United States nuclear weapons stockpile shall be submitted in classified form only.

(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4206, formerly Pub. L. 106–398, § 1 [div. C, title XXXI, § 3194], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–481; renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4206, by Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(e)(7), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1759.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2526

§ 2527. Nuclear test ban readiness program
(a) Establishment of program
(b) Purposes of program
The purposes of the program under subsection (a) shall be the following:
(1) To assure that the United States maintains a vigorous program of stockpile inspection and non-explosive testing so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban is entered into, the United States remains able to detect and identify potential problems in stockpile reliability and safety in existing designs of nuclear weapons.
(2) To assure that the specific materials, components, processes, and personnel needed for the remanufacture of existing nuclear weapons or the substitution of alternative nuclear warheads are available to support such remanufacture or substitution if such action becomes necessary in order to satisfy reliability and safety requirements under a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement.
(3) To assure that a vigorous program of research in areas related to nuclear weapons science and engineering is supported so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement is entered into, the United States is able to maintain a base of technical knowledge about nuclear weapons design and nuclear weapons effects.
(c) Conduct of program
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4207, formerly Pub. L. 100–456, div. A, title XIV, § 1436, Sept. 29, 1988, 102 Stat. 2075; Pub. L. 105–85, div. C, title XXXI, § 3152(i), Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 2042; renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4207, and amended Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(e)(8), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1759; Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, § 3146(c)(4), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1074.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2527

§ 2528. Repealed. Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3133(e)(1)(A), (2), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2192, 2193

CITE AS: 50 USC 2528

§ 2528a. Repealed. Pub. L. 110–181, div. C, title XXXI, § 3112(a), Jan. 28, 2008, 122 Stat. 577

CITE AS: 50 USC 2528a

§ 2529. Requirements for specific request for new or modified nuclear weapons
(a) Requirement for request for funds for development
(1) In any fiscal year after fiscal year 2002 in which the Secretary of Energy plans to carry out activities described in paragraph (2) relating to the development of a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon beyond phase 1 or phase 6.1 (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapon acquisition process, the Secretary—
(A) shall specifically request funds for such activities in the budget of the President for that fiscal year under section 1105(a) of title 31; and
(B) may carry out such activities only if amounts are authorized to be appropriated for such activities by an Act of Congress consistent with section 7270 of title 42.
(2) The activities described in this paragraph are as follows:
(A) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development for the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States.
(B) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States.
(C) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development for the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States.
(D) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States.
(b) Budget request format
(c) Notification and briefing of noncovered activitiesIn any fiscal year after fiscal year 2022, the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator, in conjunction with the annual submission of the budget of the President to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, shall notify the congressional defense committees of—
(1) any activities described in subsection (a)(2) relating to the development of a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon that, during the calendar year prior to the budget submission, were carried out prior to phase 2 or phase 6.2 (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapon acquisition process; and
(2) any plans to carry out, prior to phase 2 or phase 6.2 (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapon acquisition process, activities described in subsection (a)(2) relating to the development of a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon during the fiscal year covered by that budget.
(d) DefinitionsIn this section:
(1) The term “modified nuclear weapon” means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which—
(A) is in the nuclear weapons stockpile as of December 2, 2002; and
(B) is being modified in order to meet a military requirement that is other than the military requirements applicable to such nuclear weapon when first placed in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(2) The term “new nuclear weapon” means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which is neither—
(A) in the nuclear weapons stockpile on December 2, 2002; nor
(B) in production as of that date.
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4209, formerly div. C, title XXXI, § 3143, Dec. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 2733; renumbered div. D, title XLII, § 4209, by Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(e)(10), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1759; Pub. L. 111–84, div. C, title XXXI, § 3115, Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2707; Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, § 3146(c)(5), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1074; Pub. L. 115–232, div. C, title XXXI, § 3111(c), Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 2289; Pub. L. 117–263, div. C, title XXXI, § 3111, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3051.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2529

§ 2530. Testing of nuclear weapons
(a) Underground testing
(b) Atmospheric testing
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4210, formerly Pub. L. 102–377, title V, § 507(f), Oct. 2, 1992, 106 Stat. 1345; renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4210, and amended Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(e)(11), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1760; Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3131(d)(1), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2180.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2530

§ 2531. Repealed. Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3131(d)(3), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2181

CITE AS: 50 USC 2531

§ 2532. Manufacturing infrastructure for refabrication and certification of nuclear weapons stockpile
(a) Manufacturing program
(1) The Secretary of Energy shall carry out a program for purposes of establishing within the Government a manufacturing infrastructure that has the capabilities of meeting the following objectives as specified in the most recent Nuclear Posture Review:
(A) To provide a stockpile surveillance engineering base.
(B) To refabricate and certify weapon components and types in the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile, as necessary.
(C) To fabricate and certify new nuclear warheads, as necessary.
(D) To support nuclear weapons.
(E) To supply sufficient tritium in support of nuclear weapons to ensure an upload hedge in the event circumstances require.
(2) The purpose of the program carried out under paragraph (1) shall also be to develop manufacturing capabilities and capacities necessary to meet the requirements specified in the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
(b) Required capabilitiesThe manufacturing infrastructure established under the program under subsection (a) shall include the following capabilities (modernized to attain the objectives referred to in that subsection):
(1) The weapons assembly capabilities of the Pantex Plant.
(2) The weapon secondary fabrication capabilities of the Y–12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
(3) The capabilities of the Savannah River Site relating to tritium recycling and fissile materials components processing and fabrication.
(4) The non-nuclear component capabilities of the Kansas City National Security Campus, Kansas City, Missouri.
(c) Nuclear Posture Review
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4212, formerly Pub. L. 104–106, div. C, title XXXI, § 3137, Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 620; Pub. L. 104–201, div. C, title XXXI, § 3132(a), (b), Sept. 23, 1996, 110 Stat. 2829; renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4212, and amended Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(e)(13), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1760; Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3131(e), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2181; Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, § 3146(c)(6), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1074; Pub. L. 116–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3139(b)(3), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1962.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2532

§ 2533. Reports on critical difficulties at national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities
(a) Reports by heads of laboratories and facilities
(b) Transmittal by Administrator
(c) Omitted
(d) Inclusion of reports in annual stockpile assessment
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4213, formerly Pub. L. 104–201, div. C, title XXXI, § 3159, Sept. 23, 1996, 110 Stat. 2842, § 4218(b), (c), formerly Pub. L. 105–85, div. A, title XIII, § 1305(c), (d), Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 1954; Pub. L. 106–65, div. C, title XXXI, § 3163(f), Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 946; renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4213, by Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(e)(14), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1760; renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4218(c), (d), and amended Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, §§ 3131(f)(1), 3164(a)(3), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2181, 2206; renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4218(b), (c), and amended Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, § 3146(c)(7), (10)(B), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1074, 1075.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2533

§ 2534. Repealed. Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, § 3146(c)(8)(A), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1075

CITE AS: 50 USC 2534

§ 2535. Repealed. Pub. L. 117–263, div. C, title XXXI, § 3132(a)(1)(A)(i), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3060

CITE AS: 50 USC 2535

§ 2536. Reports on life extension programs
(a) Reports requiredBefore proceeding beyond phase 6.2 activities with respect to any life extension program, the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on such phase 6.2 activities, including—
(1) an assessment of the life extension options considered for the phase 6.2 activities, including whether the subsystems and components in each option are considered to be a refurbishment, reuse, or replacement of such subsystem or component; and
(2) an assessment of the option selected for the phase 6.2 activities, including—
(A) whether the subsystems and components will be refurbished, reused, or replaced; and
(B) the advantages and disadvantages of refurbishment, reuse, and replacement for each such subsystem and component.
(b) Phase 6.2 activities defined
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4216, as added Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(a), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2193; amended Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, § 3146(a)(2)(B), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1072; Pub. L. 116–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3139(b)(4)(A), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1962.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2536

§ 2537. Selected Acquisition Reports and independent cost estimates and reviews of certain programs and facilities
(a) Selected Acquisition Reports
(1) At the end of the first quarter of each fiscal year, the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension and each major alteration project (as defined in section 2753(a)(2) of this title) during the preceding fiscal year. The reports shall be known as Selected Acquisition Reports for the weapon system concerned.
(2) The information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for a fiscal year for a nuclear weapon system shall be the information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for each fiscal-year quarter in that fiscal year for a major defense acquisition program under section 4351 of title 10 or any successor system, expressed in terms of the nuclear weapon system.
(b) Independent cost estimates and reviews
(1)
(A) An independent cost estimate of the following:
(i) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.2A or new weapon system at the completion of phase 2A, relating to design definition and cost study.
(ii) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.3 or new weapon system at the completion of phase 3, relating to development engineering.
(iii) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.4, relating to production engineering, and before the initiation of phase 6.5, relating to first production.
(iv) Each new weapon system at the completion of phase 4, relating to production engineering, and before the initiation of phase 5, relating to first production.
(v) Each new nuclear facility within the nuclear security enterprise that is estimated to cost more than $500,000,000 before such facility achieves critical decision 1 and before such facility achieves critical decision 2 in the acquisition process.
(vi) Each nuclear weapons system undergoing a major alteration project (as defined in section 2753(a)(2) of this title).
(B) An independent cost review of each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.2 or new weapon system at the completion of phase 2, relating to study of feasibility and down-select.
(2) Each independent cost estimate and independent cost review under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) whether the cost baseline or the budget estimate for the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program has changed, and the rationale for any such change; and
(B) any views of the Secretary or the Administrator regarding such estimate or review.
(3) The Administrator shall review and consider the results of any independent cost estimate or independent cost review of a nuclear weapon system or a nuclear facility, as the case may be, under this subsection before entering the next phase of the development process of such system or the acquisition process of such facility.
(4) Except as otherwise specified in paragraph (1), each independent cost estimate or independent cost review of a nuclear weapon system or a nuclear facility under this subsection shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date on which—
(A) in the case of a nuclear weapons system, such system completes a phase specified in such paragraph; or
(B) in the case of a nuclear facility, such facility achieves critical decision 1 as specified in subparagraph (A)(v) of such paragraph.
(5) Each independent cost estimate or independent cost review submitted under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.
(c) Authority for further assessments
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4217, as added Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3162(a), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2204; amended Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, §§ 3112(b), 3146(a)(2)(C), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1053, 1072; Pub. L. 113–291, div. C, title XXXI, § 3114(a), (b), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3887, 3888; Pub. L. 114–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3113(b)(1), (2)(A), Nov. 25, 2015, 129 Stat. 1192; Pub. L. 115–91, div. C, title XXXI, §§ 3113, 3133(d), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1884, 1896; Pub. L. 116–283, div. C, title XXXI, § 3111(b), Jan. 1, 2021, 134 Stat. 4377; Pub. L. 117–81, div. A, title XVII, § 1702(k)(3)(A), Dec. 27, 2021, 135 Stat. 2160; Pub. L. 117–263, div. A, title VIII, § 809(c)(1), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 2706.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2537

§ 2538. Advice to President and Congress regarding safety, security, and reliability of United States nuclear weapons stockpile
(a) Policy
(1) In general
It is the policy of the United States—
(A) to maintain a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(B) as long as other nations control or actively seek to acquire nuclear weapons, to retain a credible nuclear deterrent.
(2) Nuclear weapons stockpile
(3) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(A) the United States should retain a triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against the vital interests of the United States;
(B) the United States should continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to implement an effective and robust deterrent strategy; and
(C) the advice of the persons required to provide the President and Congress with assurances of the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons force should be scientifically based, without regard for politics, and of the highest quality and integrity.
(b), (c) Omitted
(d) Advice and opinions regarding nuclear weapons stockpile
(e) Expression of individual views
(1) In general
No individual, including a representative of the President, may take any action against, or otherwise constrain, a director of a national security laboratory or a nuclear weapons production facility or a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council from presenting the professional views of the director or member, as the case may be, to the President, the National Security Council, or Congress regarding—
(A) the safety, security, reliability, or credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear forces; or
(B) the status of, and plans for, the capabilities and infrastructure that support and sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear forces.
(2) Construction
(f) Representative of the President defined
In this section, the term “representative of the President” means the following:
(1) Any official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
(2) Any member or official of the National Security Council.
(3) Any member or official of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(4) Any official of the Office of Management and Budget.
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4218, formerly Pub. L. 105–85, div. A, title XIII, § 1305, Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 1952, renumbered Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4218, and amended Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, § 3164(a), (b), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2206; Pub. L. 113–66, div. C, title XXXI, § 3146(a)(2)(D), (c)(10), Dec. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 1072, 1075; Pub. L. 113–291, div. C, title XXXI, § 3142(e), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3900; Pub. L. 116–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3139(b)(5), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1963.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2538

§ 2538a. Plutonium pit production capacity
(a) Requirement
Consistent with the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy shall ensure that the nuclear security enterprise—
(1) during 2021, begins production of qualification plutonium pits;
(2) during 2024, produces not less than 10 war reserve plutonium pits;
(3) during 2025, produces not less than 20 war reserve plutonium pits;
(4) during 2026, produces not less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits; and
(5) during 2030, produces not less than 80 war reserve plutonium pits.
(b) Annual certification
(c) Plan
(d) Certifications on plutonium enterprise
(1) Requirement
(2) Failure to certify
(e) Reports
(1) Requirement
(2) Elements
Each report under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) the number of war reserve plutonium pits planned to be produced during each year, including the associated warhead type;
(B) a description of risks and challenges to meeting the performance baseline for the covered projects, as approved in critical decision 2 in the acquisition process;
(C) options available to the Administrator to balance scope, costs, and production requirements at the projects to decrease overall risk to the plutonium enterprise and enduring plutonium pit requirements; and
(D) an explanation of any changes to the production goals or requirements as compared to the report submitted during the previous year.
(f) Prohibition on ARIES expansion before achievement of 30 pit-per-year base capability
(1) In general
Until the date on which the Administrator certifies to the congressional defense committees that the base capability to produce not less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits per year has been established at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Administrator may not—
(A) carry out a project to expand the pit disassembly and processing capability of the spaces at PF–4 occupied by ARIES as of December 22, 2023; or
(B) otherwise expand such spaces.
(2) Exceptions
Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to—
(A) ongoing or planned small projects to sustain or improve the efficiency of plutonium oxide production, provided that such projects do not expand the spaces at PF–4 occupied by ARIES as of December 22, 2023;
(B) the planning and design of an additional ARIES capability at a location other than PF–4; or
(C) the transfer of the ARIES capability to a location other than PF–4.
(3) Definitions
In this subsection:
(A) The term “ARIES” means the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System method, developed and piloted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, for disassembling surplus defense plutonium pits and converting the plutonium from such pits into plutonium oxide.
(B) The term “PF–4” means the Plutonium Facility at Technical Area 55 located at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
(g) Covered project defined
In this subsection, the term “covered project” means—
(1) the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina (Project 21–D–511); or
(2) the Plutonium Pit Production Project, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (Project 21–D–512).
(h) Management of plutonium modernization program
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4219, as added Pub. L. 113–291, div. C, title XXXI, § 3112(b)(1), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3886; amended Pub. L. 116–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3116(b), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1952; Pub. L. 117–81, div. C, title XXXI, § 3111(a), Dec. 27, 2021, 135 Stat. 2219; Pub. L. 118–31, div. C, title XXXI, §§ 3116, 3117, Dec. 22, 2023, 137 Stat. 790, 791.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2538a

§ 2538b. Stockpile responsiveness program
(a) Statement of policy
(b) Program required
(c) Objectives
The program under subsection (b) shall have the following objectives:
(1) Identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all of the capabilities, infrastructure, tools, and technologies across the science, engineering, design, certification, and manufacturing cycle required to carry out all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process, with respect to both the nuclear security enterprise and relevant elements of the Department of Defense.
(2) Identify, enhance, and transfer knowledge, skills, and direct experience with respect to all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process from one generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers to the following generation.
(3) Periodically demonstrate stockpile responsiveness throughout the range of capabilities as required, such as through the use of prototypes, flight testing, and development of plans for certification without the need for nuclear explosive testing.
(4) Shorten design, certification, and manufacturing cycles and timelines to minimize the amount of time and costs leading to an engineering prototype and production.
(5) Continually exercise processes for the integration and coordination of all relevant elements and processes of the Administration and the Department of Defense required to ensure stockpile responsiveness.
(6) The retention of the ability, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to assess and develop prototype nuclear weapons of foreign countries if needed to meet intelligence requirements and, if necessary, to conduct no-yield testing of those prototypes.
(d) Joint nuclear weapons life cycle process defined
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4220, as added Pub. L. 114–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3112(b)(1), Nov. 25, 2015, 129 Stat. 1189; amended Pub. L. 115–91, div. C, title XXXI, § 3135(b), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1898; Pub. L. 116–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3114, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1951.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2538b

§ 2538c. Long-term plan for meeting national security requirements for unencumbered uranium
(a) In general
(b) Plan requirementsThe plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An inventory of unencumbered uranium (other than depleted uranium), by program source and enrichment level, that, as of the date of the plan, is allocated to national security requirements.
(2) An inventory of unencumbered uranium (other than depleted uranium), by program source and enrichment level, that, as of the date of the plan, is not allocated to national security requirements but could be allocated to such requirements.
(3) An identification of national security requirements for unencumbered uranium through 2070, by program source and enrichment level.
(4) An assessment of current and projected unencumbered uranium production by private industry in the United States that could support future defense requirements.
(5) A description of any shortfall in obtaining unencumbered uranium to meet national security requirements and an assessment of whether that shortfall could be mitigated through the blending down of uranium that is of a higher enrichment level.
(6) An inventory of unencumbered depleted uranium, an assessment of the portion of that uranium that could be allocated to national security requirements through re-enrichment, and an estimate of the costs of re-enriching that uranium.
(7) A description of the swap and barter agreements involving unencumbered uranium needed to meet national security requirements that are in effect on the date of the plan.
(8) An assessment of—
(A) when additional enrichment of uranium will be required to meet national security requirements; and
(B) the options the Secretary is considering to meet such requirements, including an estimated cost and timeline for each option and a description of any changes to policy or law that the Secretary determines would be required for each option.
(9) An assessment of how options to provide additional enriched uranium to meet national security requirements could, as an additional benefit, contribute to the establishment of a sustained domestic enrichment capacity and allow the commercial sector of the United States to reduce reliance on importing uranium from adversary countries.
(c) Form of plan
(d) Comptroller General briefing
(e) DefinitionsIn this section:
(1) The term “depleted”, with respect to uranium, means that the uranium is depleted in uranium-235 compared with natural uranium.
(2) The term “unencumbered”, with respect to uranium, means that the United States has no obligation to foreign governments to use the uranium for only peaceful purposes.
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4221, as added Pub. L. 114–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3131(a), Nov. 25, 2015, 129 Stat. 1201; amended Pub. L. 115–91, div. C, title XXXI, § 3133(e), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1897; Pub. L. 117–263, div. C, title XXXI, § 3112, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3051.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2538c

§ 2538d. Incorporation of integrated surety architecture
(a) Shipments
(1) The Administrator shall ensure that shipments described in paragraph (2) incorporate surety technologies relating to transportation and shipping developed by the Integrated Surety Architecture program of the Administration.
(2) A shipment described in this paragraph is an over-the-road shipment of the Administration that involves any nuclear weapon planned to be in the active stockpile after 2025.
(b) Certain programs
(1) The Administrator, in coordination with the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, shall ensure that each program described in paragraph (2) incorporates integrated designs compatible with the Integrated Surety Architecture program.
(2) A program described in this subsection is a program of the Administration that is a warhead development program, a life extension program, or a warhead major alteration program.
(c) Determination
(1) If, on a case-by-case basis, the Administrator determines that a shipment under subsection (a) will not incorporate some or all of the surety technologies described in such subsection, or that a program under subsection (b) will not incorporate some or all of the integrated designs described in such subsection, the Administrator shall submit such determination to the congressional defense committees, including the results of an analysis conducted pursuant to paragraph (2).
(2) Each determination made under paragraph (1) shall be based on a documented, system risk analysis that considers security risk reduction, operational impacts, and technical risk.
(d) Termination
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4222, as added Pub. L. 115–91, div. C, title XXXI, § 3112(a), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1883.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2538d

§ 2538e. W93 nuclear warhead acquisition process
(a) Reporting requirements
(1) Phase 1Upon receiving a concept definition study under phase 1 of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle for the W93 nuclear weapon, the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes the following:
(A) A description of the potential military characteristics of the weapon.
(B) A description of the stockpile-to-target sequence requirements of the weapon.
(C) An initial assessment of the requirements a W93 nuclear weapon program is likely to generate for the nuclear security enterprise, including—
(i) adjustments to the size and composition of the workforce;
(ii) additions to existing weapon design and production capabilities; or
(iii) additional facility recapitalization or new construction.
(D) A preliminary description of other significant requirements for a W93 nuclear weapon program, including—
(i) first production unit date;
(ii) initial operational capability date;
(iii) full operational capability date; and
(iv) any unique safety and surety requirements that could increase design complexity or cost estimate uncertainty.
(2) Phase 2
(A) In generalNot later than 15 days after the date on which the Nuclear Weapons Council approves phase 2 of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle for the W93 nuclear weapon, the Administrator shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on a plan to implement a process of independent peer review or review by a board of experts, or both, with respect to—
(i) the nonnuclear components of the weapon;
(ii) subsystem design; and
(iii) engineering aspects of the weapon.
(B) Requirements for processThe Administrator shall ensure that the process required by subparagraph (A)—
(i) uses—(I) all relevant capabilities of the Federal Government, the defense industrial base, and institutions of higher education; and(II) other capabilities that the Administrator determines necessary; and
(ii) informs the entire development life cycle of the W93 nuclear weapon.
(b) Certifications and reports at phase 3Not later than 15 days after the date on which the Nuclear Weapons Council approves phase 3 of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle for the W93 nuclear weapon—
(1) the Administrator shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing that includes certifications that—— 1
1 So in original.
(A) phases 1 through 5 of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle for the weapon will employ, at a minimum, the same best practices and will provide Congress with the same level of programmatic insight as exists under the phase 6.X process for life extension programs; and
(B) the proposed design for the weapon can be carried out within estimated schedule and cost objectives; and
(2) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing, or provide to such committees a briefing on, the requirements for weapon quantity and composition by type for the sub-surface ballistic nuclear (SSBN) force, including such requirements planned for the 15-year period following the date of the report or briefing, as the case may be, including any planned life extensions, retirements, or alterations.
(c) Waivers
(d) Joint nuclear weapons life cycle defined
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4223, as added Pub. L. 116–283, div. C, title XXXI, § 3111(a)(1), Jan. 1, 2021, 134 Stat. 4375; amended Pub. L. 117–263, div. C, title XXXI, § 3131(a), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3059.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2538e

§ 2538f. Earned value management and technology readiness levels for life extension programs
(a) Review of contractor earned value management systems
The Administrator shall enter into an arrangement with an independent entity under which that entity shall—
(1) review and validate whether the earned value management systems of contractors of the Administration for life extension programs meet the earned value management national standard; and
(2) conduct periodic surveillance reviews of such systems to ensure that such systems maintain compliance with that standard through program completion.
(b) Benchmarks for technology readiness levels
The Administrator shall—
(1) establish specific benchmarks for technology readiness levels of critical technologies for life extension programs at key decision points; and
(2) ensure that critical technologies meet such benchmarks at such decision points.
(c) Applicability
(d) Definition
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4224, as added Pub. L. 116–283, div. C, title XXXI, § 3112(a), Jan. 1, 2021, 134 Stat. 4377.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 2538f