1. U.S. Code
  2. title 50
  3. chapter 45
  4. subchapter IV
  5. § 3369

Collapse to view only § 3369. Cooperative actions to detect and counter foreign influence operations

§ 3361. National Virtual Translation Center
(a) Establishment
(b) Designation
(c) FunctionThe element established under subsection (a) shall provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence for all elements of the intelligence community through—
(1) the integration of the translation capabilities of the intelligence community;
(2) the use of remote-connection capabilities; and
(3) the use of such other capabilities as the Director considers appropriate.
(d) Administrative matters
(1) The Director shall retain direct supervision and control over the element established under subsection (a).
(2) The element established under subsection (a) shall connect elements of the intelligence community utilizing the most current available information technology that is applicable to the function of the element.
(3) Personnel of the element established under subsection (a) may carry out the duties and functions of the element at any location that—
(A) has been certified as a secure facility by a department or agency of the United States Government; or
(B) the Director has otherwise determined to be appropriate for such duties and functions.
(e) Deadline for establishment
(Pub. L. 107–306, title III, § 313, Nov. 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 2391; Pub. L. 108–458, title I, § 1071(g)(2)(A)(i), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3691; Pub. L. 108–487, title III, § 304, Dec. 23, 2004, 118 Stat. 3944; Pub. L. 118–31, div. G, title IX, § 7901(f)(1), Dec. 22, 2023, 137 Stat. 1107.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3361

§ 3362. Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center
(a) Establishment
(b) Designation
(c) Deadline for establishment
(Pub. L. 107–306, title III, § 341, Nov. 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 2398; Pub. L. 108–458, title I, § 1071(g)(2)(C), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3691.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3362

§ 3363. Terrorist Identification Classification System
(a) Requirement
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall—
(A) establish and maintain a list of individuals who are known or suspected international terrorists, and of organizations that are known or suspected international terrorist organizations; and
(B) ensure that pertinent information on the list is shared with the departments, agencies, and organizations described by subsection (c).
(2) The list under paragraph (1), and the mechanisms for sharing information on the list, shall be known as the “Terrorist Identification Classification System”.
(b) Administration
(1) The Director shall prescribe requirements for the inclusion of an individual or organization on the list required by subsection (a), and for the deletion or omission from the list of an individual or organization currently on the list.
(2) The Director shall ensure that the information utilized to determine the inclusion, or deletion or omission, of an individual or organization on or from the list is derived from all-source intelligence.
(3) The Director shall ensure that the list is maintained in accordance with existing law and regulations governing the collection, storage, and dissemination of intelligence concerning United States persons.
(c) Information sharing
(d) Report on criteria for information sharing
(1) Not later than March 1, 2003, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the criteria used to determine which types of information on the list required by subsection (a) are to be shared, and which types of information are not to be shared, with various departments and agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies, and entities of foreign governments and international organizations.
(2) The report shall include a description of the circumstances in which the Director has determined that sharing information on the list with the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and of State and local governments, described by subsection (c) would be inappropriate due to the concerns addressed by section 403–3(c)(7) 1
1 See References in Text note below.
of this title, relating to the protection of sources and methods, and any instance in which the sharing of information on the list has been inappropriate in light of such concerns.
(e) System administration requirements
(1) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, ensure the interoperability of the Terrorist Identification Classification System with relevant information systems of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and of State and local governments, described by subsection (c).
(2) The Director shall ensure that the System utilizes technologies that are effective in aiding the identification of individuals in the field.
(f) Report on status of System
(1) Not later than one year after November 27, 2002, the Director shall, in consultation with the Director of Homeland Security, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the status of the Terrorist Identification Classification System. The report shall contain a certification on the following:
(A) Whether the System contains the intelligence information necessary to facilitate the contribution of the System to the domestic security of the United States.
(B) Whether the departments and agencies having access to the System have access in a manner that permits such departments and agencies to carry out appropriately their domestic security responsibilities.
(C) Whether the System is operating in a manner that maximizes its contribution to the domestic security of the United States.
(D) If a certification under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) is in the negative, the modifications or enhancements of the System necessary to ensure a future certification in the positive.
(2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(g) Congressional intelligence committees definedIn this section, the term “congressional intelligence committees” means—
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(Pub. L. 107–306, title III, § 343, Nov. 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 2399; Pub. L. 108–177, title III, § 377(d), Dec. 13, 2003, 117 Stat. 2631; Pub. L. 108–458, title I, §§ 1071(g)(2)(A)(ii), 1072(d)(1)(A), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3691, 3693; Pub. L. 111–259, title III, § 347(f), Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2699; Pub. L. 118–31, div. G, title IX, § 7901(f)(2), Dec. 22, 2023, 137 Stat. 1107.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3363

§ 3364. Assignment of responsibilities relating to analytic integrity
(a) Assignment of responsibilities
(b) Responsibilities
(1) The individual or entity assigned responsibility under subsection (a)—
(A) may be responsible for general oversight and management of analysis and production, but may not be directly responsible for, or involved in, the specific production of any finished intelligence product;
(B) shall perform, on a regular basis, detailed reviews of finished intelligence product or other analytic products by an element or elements of the intelligence community covering a particular topic or subject matter;
(C) shall be responsible for identifying on an annual basis functional or topical areas of analysis for specific review under subparagraph (B); and
(D) upon completion of any review under subparagraph (B), may draft lessons learned, identify best practices, or make recommendations for improvement to the analytic tradecraft employed in the production of the reviewed product or products.
(2) Each review under paragraph (1)(B) should—
(A) include whether the product or products concerned were based on all sources of available intelligence, properly describe the quality and reliability of underlying sources, properly caveat and express uncertainties or confidence in analytic judgments, properly distinguish between underlying intelligence and the assumptions and judgments of analysts, and incorporate, where appropriate, alternative analyses; and
(B) ensure that the analytic methodologies, tradecraft, and practices used by the element or elements concerned in the production of the product or products concerned meet the standards set forth in subsection (a).
(3) Information drafted under paragraph (1)(D) should, as appropriate, be included in analysis teaching modules and case studies for use throughout the intelligence community.
(c) Annual briefings
(d) Congressional intelligence committees definedIn this section, the term “congressional intelligence committees” means—
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(Pub. L. 108–458, title I, § 1019, Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3671; Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LVII, § 5701(b), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2159.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3364

§ 3365. Foreign intelligence information
(1) In general
(2) DefinitionIn this section, the term “foreign intelligence information” means—
(A) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against—
(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or
(iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(B) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to—
(i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
(Pub. L. 107–56, title II, § 203(d), Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 281; Pub. L. 107–296, title VIII, § 897(a), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2257; Pub. L. 117–347, title III, § 323(a)(1)(A), Jan. 5, 2023, 136 Stat. 6206.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3365

§ 3366. Authorities of heads of other departments and agencies

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of any department or agency of the United States is authorized to receive and utilize funds made available to the department or agency by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 3024(d)(2) of this title, as amended by subsection (a), and receive and utilize any system referred to in such section that is made available to such department or agency.

(Pub. L. 111–259, title IV, § 402(b), Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2709.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3366

§ 3367. Requirement for efficient use by intelligence community of open-source intelligence

The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the intelligence community makes efficient and effective use of open-source information and analysis.

(Pub. L. 108–458, title I, § 1052(b), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3683.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3367

§ 3368. Assistance for governmental entities and private entities in recognizing online violent extremist content
(a) Assistance to recognize online violent extremist content
(b) Updates
(Pub. L. 115–31, div. N, title IV, § 403, May 5, 2017, 131 Stat. 820; Pub. L. 118–31, div. G, title III, § 7327(d), Dec. 22, 2023, 137 Stat. 1045.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3368

§ 3369. Cooperative actions to detect and counter foreign influence operations
(a) FindingsCongress makes the following findings:
(1) The Russian Federation, through military intelligence units, also known as the “GRU”, and Kremlin-linked troll organizations often referred to as the “Internet Research Agency”, deploy information warfare operations against the United States, its allies and partners, with the goal of advancing the strategic interests of the Russian Federation.
(2) One line of effort deployed as part of these information warfare operations is the weaponization of social media platforms with the goals of intensifying societal tensions, undermining trust in governmental institutions within the United States, its allies and partners in the West, and generally sowing division, fear, and confusion.
(3) These information warfare operations are a threat to the national security of the United States and that of the allies and partners of the United States. As former Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats stated, “These actions are persistent, they are pervasive and they are meant to undermine America’s democracy.”.
(4) These information warfare operations continue to evolve and increase in sophistication.
(5) Other foreign adversaries and hostile non-state actors are increasingly adopting similar tactics of deploying information warfare operations against the West, such as recent state-backed operations from China around the Hong Kong protests identified by social media companies.
(6) Technological advances, including artificial intelligence, will only make it more difficult in the future to detect fraudulent accounts, deceptive material posted on social media, and malign behavior on social media platforms.
(7) Because these information warfare operations are deployed within and across private social media platforms, the companies that own these platforms have a responsibility to detect and facilitate the removal or neutralization of foreign adversary networks operating clandestinely on their platforms.
(8) The social media companies are inherently technologically sophisticated and adept at rapidly analyzing large amounts of data and developing software-based solutions to diverse and ever-changing challenges on their platforms, which makes them well-equipped to address the threat occurring on their platforms.
(9) Independent analyses confirmed Kremlin-linked threat networks, based on data provided by several social media companies to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, thereby demonstrating that it is possible to discern both broad patterns of cross-platform information warfare operations and specific fraudulent behavior on social media platforms.
(10) General Paul Nakasone, Director of the National Security Agency, emphasized the importance of these independent analyses to the planning and conducting of military cyber operations to frustrate Kremlin-linked information warfare operations against the 2018 mid-term elections. General Nakasone stated that the reports “were very, very helpful in terms of being able to understand exactly what our adversary was trying to do to build dissent within our nation.”.
(11) Institutionalizing ongoing robust, independent, and vigorous analysis of data related to foreign threat networks within and across social media platforms will help counter ongoing information warfare operations against the United States, its allies, and its partners.
(12) Archiving and disclosing to the public the results of these analyses by the social media companies and trusted third-party experts in a transparent manner will serve to demonstrate that the social media companies are detecting and removing foreign malign activities from their platforms while protecting the privacy of the people of the United States and will build public understanding of the scale and scope of these foreign threats to our democracy, since exposure is one of the most effective means to build resilience.
(b) Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the social media companies should cooperate among themselves and with independent organizations and researchers on a sustained and regular basis to share and analyze data and indicators relevant to foreign information warfare operations within and across their platforms in order to detect and counter foreign information warfare operations that threaten the national security of the United States and its allies and partners;
(2) information from law enforcement and the intelligence community is also important in assisting efforts by these social media companies to identify foreign information warfare operations;
(3) these analytic efforts should be organized in such a fashion as to meet the highest standards of ethics, confidentiality, and privacy protection of the people of the United States, while still allowing timely research access to relevant data;
(4) these analytic efforts should be undertaken as soon as possible to facilitate countering ongoing state or state-backed foreign information warfare operations and to aid in preparations for the United States Presidential and congressional elections in 2020 and beyond;
(5) the structure and operations of social media companies make them well positioned to work with independent organizations and researchers to address foreign adversary threat networks within and across their platforms, and these efforts could be conducted without direct Government involvement, direction, or regulation; and
(6) if the social media industry fails to take sufficient action to address foreign adversary threat networks operating within or across their platforms, Congress would have to consider additional safeguards for ensuring that this threat is effectively mitigated.
(c) Requirement to facilitate establishment of Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center
(1) Requirement
(2) FunctionsThe functions described in this paragraph are the following:
(A) Acting as a convening and sponsoring authority for cooperative social media data analysis of foreign threat networks involving social media companies and third-party experts, nongovernmental organizations, data journalists, Federally funded research and development centers, academic researchers, traditional media, and international counterparts, as appropriate.
(B) Facilitating analysis of foreign influence operation, within and across the individual social media platforms as well as hacking and leaking campaigns, and other tactics, and related unlawful activities that fund or subsidize such operations.
(C) Developing processes to share information from government entities on foreign influence operations with the individual social media companies to inform threat analysis, and working with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as appropriate.
(D) Determining and making public criteria for identifying which companies, organizations, or researchers qualify for inclusion in the activities of the Center, and inviting entities that fit the criteria to join.
(E) Determining jointly with the social media companies what data and metadata related to indicators of foreign adversary threat networks from their platforms and business operations will be made available for access and analysis.
(F) Developing and making public the criteria and standards that must be met for companies, other organizations, and individual researchers to access and analyze data relating to foreign adversary threat networks within and across social media platforms and publish or otherwise use the results.
(G) Developing and making public the ethical standards for investigation of foreign threat networks and use of analytic results and for protection of the privacy of the customers and users of the social media platforms and of the proprietary information of the social media companies.
(H) Developing technical, contractual, and procedural controls to prevent misuse of data, including any necessary auditing procedures, compliance checks, and review mechanisms.
(I) Developing and making public criteria and conditions under which the Center shall share information with the appropriate Government agencies regarding threats to national security from, or violations of the law involving, foreign activities on social media platforms.
(J) Hosting a searchable archive aggregating information related to foreign influence and disinformation operations to build a collective understanding of the threats and facilitate future examination consistent with privacy protections.
(K) Developing data standards to harmonize the sharing of information pursuant to this paragraph.
(d) Reporting and notificationsThe Director of the Center shall—
(1) not later than August 1, 2021, submit to appropriate congressional committees a report on—
(A) the estimated funding needs of the Center for fiscal year 2021 and for subsequent years;
(B) such statutory protections from liability as the Director considers necessary for the Center, participating social media companies, and participating third-party analytical participants;
(C) such statutory penalties as the Director considers necessary to ensure against misuse of data by researchers; and
(D) such changes to the Center’s mission to fully capture broader unlawful activities that intersect with, complement, or support information warfare tactics; and
(2) not less frequently than once each year, submit to the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the appropriate congressional committees a report—
(A) that assesses—
(i) degree of cooperation and commitment from the social media companies to the mission of the Center; and
(ii) effectiveness of the Center in detecting and facilitating the removal or neutralization of clandestine foreign information warfare operations from social media platforms; and
(B) includes such recommendations for legislative or administrative action as the Center considers appropriate to carry out the functions of the Center.
(e) Periodic reporting to the publicThe Director of the Center shall—
(1) once each quarter, make available to the public a report on key trends in foreign influence and disinformation operations, including any threats to campaigns and elections, to inform the public of the United States; and
(2) as the Director considers necessary, provide more timely assessments relating to ongoing disinformation campaigns.
(f) Foreign malign influence campaigns on social media platforms targeting elections for Federal office
(1) Reports
(A) Requirement
(B) Matters includedEach report under subparagraph (A) shall include an analysis of the following:
(i) The patterns, tools, and techniques of foreign malign influence campaigns across all platforms on social media by a covered foreign country targeting a regularly scheduled general election for Federal office.
(ii) Inauthentic accounts and “bot” networks across platforms, including the scale to which such accounts or networks exist, how platforms currently act to remove such accounts or networks, and what percentage of such accounts or networks have been removed during the period covered by the report.
(iii) The estimated reach and impact of intentional or weaponized disinformation by inauthentic accounts and “bot” networks, including an analysis of amplification by users and algorithmic distribution.
(iv) The trends of types of media that are being used for dissemination through foreign malign influence campaigns, including machine-manipulated media, and the intended targeted groups.
(C) Initial report
(D) Form
(2) Briefings
(A) Requirement
(B) Matters to be includedEach briefing under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
(i) The patterns, tools, and techniques of foreign malign influence campaigns across all platforms on social media by a covered foreign country targeting a regularly scheduled general election for Federal office.
(ii) An assessment of the findings from the report for which the briefing is provided.
(iii) The activities and methods used to mitigate the threats associated with such findings by the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, or other relevant departments or agencies of the Federal Government.
(iv) The steps taken by departments or agencies of the Federal Government to cooperate with social media companies to mitigate the threats identified.
(g) Funding
(h) Definitions
(1) Appropriate congressional committeesThe term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(2) Covered foreign country and foreign malign influence
(3) Machine-manipulated media
(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LIII, § 5323, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2130; Pub. L. 116–283, div. H, title XCIII, § 9301, Jan. 1, 2021, 134 Stat. 4801.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3369

§ 3369a. Report on deepfake technology, foreign weaponization of deepfakes, and related notifications
(a) Report on foreign weaponization of deepfakes and deepfake technology
(1) Report requiredNot later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on—
(A) the potential national security impacts of machine-manipulated media (commonly known as “deepfakes”); and
(B) the actual or potential use of machine-manipulated media by foreign governments to spread disinformation or engage in other malign activities.
(2) Matters to be includedThe report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(A) An assessment of the technical capabilities of foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, with respect to machine-manipulated media, machine-generated text, generative adversarial networks, and related machine-learning technologies, including—
(i) an assessment of the technical capabilities of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation with respect to the production and detection of machine-manipulated media; and
(ii) an annex describing those governmental elements within China and Russia known to have supported or facilitated machine-manipulated media research, development, or dissemination, as well as any civil-military fusion, private-sector, academic, or nongovernmental entities which have meaningfully participated in such activities.
(B) An updated assessment of how foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, could use or are using machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text to harm the national security interests of the United States, including an assessment of the historic, current, or potential future efforts of China and Russia to use machine-manipulated media, including with respect to—
(i) the overseas or domestic dissemination of misinformation;
(ii) the attempted discrediting of political opponents or disfavored populations; and
(iii) intelligence or influence operations directed against the United States, allies or partners of the United States, or other jurisdictions believed to be subject to Chinese or Russian interference.
(C) An updated identification of the countertechnologies that have been or could be developed and deployed by the United States Government, or by the private sector with Government support, to deter, detect, and attribute the use of machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text by foreign governments, foreign-government affiliates, or foreign individuals, along with an analysis of the benefits, limitations and drawbacks of such identified counter-technologies, including any emerging concerns related to privacy.
(D) An identification of the offices within the elements of the intelligence community that have, or should have, lead responsibility for monitoring the development of, use of, and response to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text, including—
(i) a description of the coordination of such efforts across the intelligence community;
(ii) a detailed description of the existing capabilities, tools, and relevant expertise of such elements to determine whether a piece of media has been machine manipulated or machine generated, including the speed at which such determination can be made, the confidence level of the element in the ability to make such a determination accurately, and how increasing volume and improved quality of machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text may negatively impact such capabilities; and
(iii) a detailed description of planned or ongoing research and development efforts intended to improve the ability of the intelligence community to detect machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text.
(E) A description of any research and development activities carried out or under consideration to be carried out by the intelligence community, including the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, relevant to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text detection technologies.
(F) Updated recommendations regarding whether the intelligence community requires additional legal authorities, financial resources, or specialized personnel to address the national security threat posed by machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text.
(G) Other additional information the Director determines appropriate.
(b) Form
(c) Requirement for notificationThe Director of National Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of any other relevant departments or agencies of the Federal Government, shall notify the congressional intelligence committees each time the Director of National Intelligence determines—
(1) there is credible information or intelligence that a foreign entity has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt to deploy machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text aimed at the elections or domestic political processes of the United States; and
(2) that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign government, a foreign government-affiliated entity, or a foreign individual.
(d) Definitions
(1) Machine-generated text
(2) Machine-manipulated media
(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LVII, § 5709, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2168; Pub. L. 117–263, div. F, title LXVIII, § 6811(b), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3600.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3369a

§ 3369b. Oversight of foreign influence in academia
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Covered institution of higher education
(2) Sensitive research subject
The term “sensitive research subject” means a subject of research that is carried out at a covered institution of higher education that receives funds that were appropriated for—
(A) the National Intelligence Program; or
(B) any Federal agency the Director of National Intelligence deems appropriate.
(b) Report required
(c) Contents
The report required by subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1) A list of sensitive research subjects that could affect national security.
(2) A list of foreign entities, including governments, corporations, nonprofit organizations and for-profit organizations, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, that the Director determines pose a counterintelligence, espionage (including economic espionage), or other national security threat with respect to sensitive research subjects.
(3) A list of any known or suspected attempts by foreign entities to exert pressure on covered institutions of higher education, including attempts to limit freedom of speech, propagate misinformation or disinformation, or to influence professors, researchers, or students.
(4) Recommendations for collaboration between covered institutions of higher education and the intelligence community to mitigate threats to sensitive research subjects associated with foreign influence in academia, including any necessary legislative or administrative action.
(d) Congressional notifications required
(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LVII, § 5713, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2172.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3369b

§ 3369c. Notification of an active measures campaign
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership
The term “congressional leadership” includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(b) Requirement for notification
(c) Content of notification
(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXVII, § 6703, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2223.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3369c

§ 3369d. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence over peoples and governments
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence
The term “active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence” means activities intended to influence a person or government that are carried out in coordination with, or at the behest of, political leaders or the security services of the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or other nation state and the role of the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or other nation state has been hidden or not acknowledged publicly, including the following:
(A) Establishment or funding of a front group.
(B) Covert broadcasting.
(C) Media manipulation.
(D) Disinformation and forgeries.
(E) Funding agents of influence.
(F) Incitement and offensive counterintelligence.
(G) Assassinations.
(H) Terrorist acts.
(2) Appropriate committees of Congress
The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b) Establishment
(c) Membership
(1) In general
(A) Appointment
(B) Head of an agency or department
The head of an agency or department of the Government set out under this subparagraph are the following:
(i) The Director of National Intelligence.
(ii) The Secretary of State.
(iii) The Secretary of Defense.
(iv) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(v) The Attorney General.
(vi) The Secretary of Energy.
(vii) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(viii) The head of any other agency or department of the United States Government designated by the President for purposes of this section.
(d) Meetings
(e) Duties
The duties of the committee established by subsection (b) shall be as follows:
(1) To counter active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence, including by exposing falsehoods, agents of influence, corruption, human rights abuses, terrorism, and assassinations carried out by the security services or political elites of the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or other nation state or their proxies.
(2) Such other duties as the President may designate for purposes of this section.
(f) Staff
(g) Budget Request
(h) Annual report
(1) Requirement
(2) Content
Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A summary of the active measures by the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence during the previous year, including significant incidents and notable trends.
(B) A description of the key initiatives of the committee.
(C) A description of the implementation of the committee’s initiatives by the head of an agency or department of the Government set out under subsection (c)(1)(B).
(D) An analysis of the impact of the committee’s initiatives.
(E) Recommendations for changes to the committee’s initiatives from the previous year.
(3) Separate reporting requirement
(Pub. L. 115–31, div. N, title V, § 501, May 5, 2017, 131 Stat. 823; Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXVII, § 6706(a), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2224.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3369d

§ 3370. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force
(a) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.
(b) Requirement to establish
(c) Members
The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall be composed of—
(1) a representative of the Defense Security Service of the Department of Defense;
(2) a representative of the General Services Administration;
(3) a representative of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy of the Office of Management and Budget;
(4) a representative of the Department of Homeland Security;
(5) a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(6) the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center; and
(7) any other members the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(d) Security clearances
(e) Annual report
(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXIII, § 6306, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2188.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3370

§ 3370a. Biennial report on foreign investment risks
(a) Intelligence community interagency working group
(1) Requirement to establish
(2) Chairperson
(3) Membership
(b) Biennial report on foreign investment risks
(1) Report required
(2) Elements
Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include identification, analysis, and explanation of the following:
(A) Any current or projected major threats to the national security of the United States with respect to foreign investment.
(B) Any strategy used by a foreign country that such interagency working group has identified to be a country of special concern to use foreign investment to target the acquisition of critical technologies, critical materials, or critical infrastructure.
(C) Any economic espionage efforts directed at the United States by a foreign country, particularly such a country of special concern.
(c) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXVII, § 6716, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2227.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3370a

§ 3370b. Collaboration between intelligence community and Department of Commerce to counter foreign commercial threats
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Foreign commercial threat
(A) In general
(B) Determinations by Working Group
In determining whether an item or service is a foreign commercial threat, the Working Group shall consider whether the strategic competitor or foreign adversary could—
(i) withhold, or threaten to withhold, the rare commercial item or service;
(ii) create reliance on the rare commercial item or service as essential to the safety, health, or economic wellbeing of the intended recipient; or
(iii) have its rare commercial item or service easily replaced by a United States entity or an entity of an ally or partner of the United States.
(3) Rare commercial item or service
(b) Working Group
(1) Establishment
(2) Membership
(3) Duties
The duties of the Working Group shall be the following:
(A) To identify current foreign commercial threats.
(B) To identify probable future foreign commercial threats.
(C) To identify goods, services, or intellectual property that, if produced by entities within the United States, or allies or partners of the United States, would mitigate foreign commercial threats.
(4) Meetings
(5) Termination
Beginning on the date that is 2 years after the date of the establishment under paragraph (1), the Working Group may be terminated upon the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce jointly—
(A) determining that termination of the Working Group is appropriate; and
(B) submitting to the appropriate congressional committees a notification of such determination (including a description of the justification for such determination).
(6) Reports
(A) Submission to Congress
(B) Matters
Each report under subparagraph (A) shall include a description of the following:
(i) Any current or future foreign commercial threats identified by the Working Group.
(ii) The strategy of the United States Government, if any, to mitigate any current foreign commercial threats or future foreign commercial threats so identified.
(iii) The plan of the intelligence community to provide to the Department of Commerce and other nontraditional customers of the intelligence community support in addressing foreign commercial threats.
(iv) Any other significant activity of the Working Group.
(c) Option to discharge obligation through other means
(Pub. L. 117–263, div. F, title LXV, § 6514, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3546.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3370b

§ 3371. Required counterintelligence assessments, briefings, notifications, and reports
(a) Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to Federal election campaigns
(1) Reports required
(A) In generalAs provided in subparagraph (B), with respect to an election for Federal office, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an internet website an advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to campaigns of candidates for Federal office. Each such report, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, shall include the following:
(i) A description of foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to campaigns of candidates for Federal office.
(ii) A summary of best practices that campaigns of candidates for Federal office can employ in seeking to counter such threats.
(iii) An identification of publicly available resources, including United States Government resources, for countering such threats.
(B) Schedule for submittal
(i) In general
(ii) 2020 elections
(C) Information to be included
(2) Treatment of campaigns subject to heightened threats
(b) Omitted
(c) Director of National Intelligence assessment of foreign interference in Federal elections
(1) Assessments requiredNot later than 45 days after the end of a Federal election cycle, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of such other executive departments and agencies as the Director considers appropriate, shall—
(A) conduct an assessment of any information indicating that a foreign government, or any person acting as an agent of or on behalf of a foreign government, has acted with the intent or purpose of interfering in elections for Federal office occurring during the Federal election cycle; and
(B) transmit the findings of the Director with respect to the assessment conducted under subparagraph (A), along with such supporting information as the Director considers appropriate, to the following:
(i) The President.
(ii) The Secretary of State.
(iii) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(iv) The Secretary of Defense.
(v) The Attorney General.
(vi) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
(vii) Congress.
(2) ElementsAn assessment conducted under paragraph (1)(A), with respect to an act described in such paragraph, shall identify, to the maximum extent ascertainable, the following:
(A) The nature of any foreign interference and any methods employed to execute the act.
(B) The persons involved.
(C) The foreign government or governments that authorized, directed, sponsored, or supported the act.
(3) Publication
(4) Federal election cycle defined
(5) Effective date
(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LIII, § 5304, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2119.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3371

§ 3371a. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal elections
(a) DefinitionsIn this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committeesThe term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadershipThe term “congressional leadership” includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(3) Security vulnerability
(b) In generalThe Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall—
(1) commence not later than 1 year before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, and complete not later than 180 days before such election, an assessment of security vulnerabilities of State election systems; and
(2) not later than 180 days before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, submit a report on such security vulnerabilities and an assessment of foreign intelligence threats to the election to—
(A) congressional leadership; and
(B) the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) UpdateNot later than 90 days before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(1) update the assessment of foreign intelligence threats to that election; and
(2) submit the updated assessment to—
(A) congressional leadership; and
(B) the appropriate congressional committees.
(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXV, § 6503, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2203; Pub. L. 117–263, div. G, title LXXI, § 7143(d)(7), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3664.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3371a

§ 3371b. Information sharing with State election officials
(a) State defined
(b) Security clearances
(1) In general
(2) Interim clearances
(c) Information sharing
(1) In general
(2) Coordination
(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXV, § 6506, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2206.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3371b

§ 3371c. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns directed at elections for Federal offices
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Active measures campaign
(2) Candidate, election, and political party
(3) Congressional leadership
The term “congressional leadership” includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(4) Cyber intrusion
(5) Electronic election infrastructure
The term “electronic election infrastructure” means an electronic information system of any of the following that is related to an election for Federal office:
(A) The Federal Government.
(B) A State or local government.
(C) A political party.
(D) The election campaign of a candidate.
(6) Federal office
(7) High confidence
(8) Moderate confidence
(9) Other appropriate congressional committees
The term “other appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Determinations of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns
The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly carry out subsection (c) if such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine—
(1) that on or after December 20, 2019, a significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended to influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has occurred or is occurring; and
(2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.
(c) Briefing
(1) In general
Not later than 14 days after making a determination under subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence committees and, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, the other appropriate congressional committees. The briefing shall be classified and address, at a minimum, the following:
(A) A description of the significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be, covered by the determination.
(B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such intrusion or campaign has been attributed.
(C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures campaign.
(D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine appropriate.
(2) Electronic election infrastructure briefings
(3) Protection of sources and methods
(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXV, § 6507, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2207.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3371c

§ 3371d. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead election security matters
(a) In general
(b) Additional responsibilities
The person designated under subsection (a) shall also lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to risks posed by interference from foreign powers (as defined in section 1801 of this title) to the following:
(1) The Federal Government election security supply chain.
(2) Election voting systems and software.
(3) Voter registration databases.
(4) Critical infrastructure related to elections.
(5) Such other Government goods and services as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
(Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXV, § 6508, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2208.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3371d

§ 3372. Monitoring mineral investments under Belt and Road Initiative of People’s Republic of China
(a) Report requiredNot later than 1 year after December 27, 2020, the Director of National Intelligence (referred to in this section as the “Director”), in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the United States Trade Representative, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on investments in minerals under the Belt and Road Initiative of the People’s Republic of China that includes an assessment of—
(1) notable past mineral investments;
(2) whether and how such investments have increased the extent of control of minerals by the People’s Republic of China;
(3) any efforts by the People’s Republic of China to counter or interfere with the goals of the Energy Resource Governance Initiative of the Department of State; and
(4) the strategy of the People’s Republic of China with respect to mineral investments.
(b) Monitoring mechanismIn conjunction with each report required by subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of any minerals with respect to which—
(1) the People’s Republic of China, directly or through the Belt and Road Initiative—
(A) is increasing its concentration of extraction and processing;
(B) is acquiring significant mining and processing facilities;
(C) is maintaining or increasing export restrictions; or
(D) has achieved substantial control of the supply of minerals used within an industry or related minerals;
(2) there is a significant difference between domestic prices in the People’s Republic of China as compared to prices on international markets; or
(3) there is a significant increase or volatility in price as a result of the Belt and Road Initiative of the People’s Republic of China.
(c) Critical mineral evaluationFor any mineral included on the list required by subsection (b) that is not already designated as critical by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to section 1606(c) of title 30, the Director shall—
(1) determine, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the United States Trade Representative, whether the mineral is strategic and critical to the defense or national security of the United States; and
(2) make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Interior regarding the designation of the mineral under section 1606(c) of title 30.
(d) Annual updates
(e) Form
(f) Appropriate congressional committees definedIn this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(Pub. L. 116–260, div. Z, title VII, § 7003, Dec. 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 2577.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3372

§ 3373. Establishment of All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office
(a) Establishment of Office
(1) In general
(2) Designation
(b) Director and Deputy Director of the Office
(1) Appointment of Director
(2) Appointment of Deputy Director
(3) Reporting
(A) In general
(B) Administrative and operational and security mattersThe Director of the Office shall report—
(i) to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security on all administrative matters of the Office; and
(ii) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence on all operational and security matters of the Office.
(c) DutiesThe duties of the Office shall include the following:
(1) Developing procedures to synchronize and standardize the collection, reporting, and analysis of incidents, including adverse physiological effects, regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena across the Department of Defense and the intelligence community, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, which shall be provided to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees, and congressional leadership.
(2) Developing processes and procedures to ensure that such incidents from each component of the Department and each element of the intelligence community are reported and stored in an appropriate manner that allows for the integration of analysis of such information.
(3) Establishing procedures to require the timely and consistent reporting of such incidents.
(4) Evaluating links between unidentified anomalous phenomena and adversarial foreign governments, other foreign governments, or nonstate actors.
(5) Evaluating the threat that such incidents present to the United States.
(6) Coordinating with other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, as appropriate, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy.
(7) As appropriate, and in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence, consulting with allies and partners of the United States to better assess the nature and extent of unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(8) Preparing reports for Congress, in both classified and unclassified form, including under subsection (j).
(d) Response to and field investigations of unidentified anomalous phenomena
(1) Designation
(2) Ability to respond
(e) Scientific, technological, and operational analyses of data on unidentified anomalous phenomena
(1) Designation
(2) Authority
(f) Data; intelligence collection
(1) Availability of data and reporting on unidentified anomalous phenomena
(A) Availability of data
(B) Reporting
(2) Intelligence collection and analysis plan
(3) Use of resources and capabilities
(g) Science planThe Director of the Office, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall supervise the development and execution of a science plan to develop and test, as practicable, scientific theories to—
(1) account for characteristics and performance of unidentified anomalous phenomena that exceed the known state of the art in science or technology, including in the areas of propulsion, aerodynamic control, signatures, structures, materials, sensors, countermeasures, weapons, electronics, and power generation; and
(2) provide the foundation for potential future investments to replicate or otherwise better understand any such advanced characteristics and performance.
(h) Assignment of priority
(i) Detailees from elements of the intelligence community
(j) Historical record report
(1) Report required
(A) In generalNot later than 540 days after December 23, 2022, the Director of the Office shall submit to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees, and congressional leadership a written report detailing the historical record of the United States Government relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena, including—
(i) the records and documents of the intelligence community;
(ii) oral history interviews;
(iii) open source analysis;
(iv) interviews of current and former Government officials;
(v) classified and unclassified national archives including any records any third party obtained pursuant to section 552 of title 5; and
(vi) such other relevant historical sources as the Director of the Office considers appropriate.
(B) Other requirementsThe report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall—
(i) focus on the period beginning on January 1, 1945, and ending on the date on which the Director of the Office completes activities under this subsection; and
(ii) include a compilation and itemization of the key historical record of the involvement of the intelligence community with unidentified anomalous phenomena, including—(I) any program or activity that was protected by restricted access that has not been explicitly and clearly reported to Congress;(II) successful or unsuccessful efforts to identify and track unidentified anomalous phenomena; and(III) any efforts to obfuscate, manipulate public opinion, hide, or otherwise provide incorrect unclassified or classified information about unidentified anomalous phenomena or related activities.
(2) Access to records of the National Archives and Records Administration
(k) Annual reports
(1) Reports from All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office
(A) Requirement
(B) ElementsEach report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the following information:
(i) All reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-related events that occurred during the one-year period.
(ii) All reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-related events that occurred during a period other than that one-year period but were not included in an earlier report.
(iii) An analysis of data and intelligence received through each reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-related event.
(iv) An analysis of data relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena collected through—(I) geospatial intelligence;(II) signals intelligence;(III) human intelligence; and(IV) measurement and signature intelligence.
(v) The number of reported incidents of unidentified anomalous phenomena over restricted airspace of the United States during the one-year period.
(vi) An analysis of such incidents identified under clause (v).
(vii) Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by unidentified anomalous phenomena to the national security of the United States.
(viii) An assessment of any activity regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena that can be attributed to one or more adversarial foreign governments.
(ix) Identification of any incidents or patterns regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena that indicate a potential adversarial foreign government may have achieved a breakthrough aerospace capability.
(x) An update on the coordination by the United States with allies and partners on efforts to track, understand, and address unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(xi) An update on any efforts underway on the ability to capture or exploit discovered unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(xii) An assessment of any health-related effects for individuals that have encountered unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(xiii) The number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous phenomena associated with military nuclear assets, including strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships and submarines.
(xiv) In consultation with the Administrator for Nuclear Security, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous phenomena associated with facilities or assets associated with the production, transportation, or storage of nuclear weapons or components thereof.
(xv) In consultation with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous phenomena or drones of unknown origin associated with nuclear power generating stations, nuclear fuel storage sites, or other sites or facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(xvi) The names of the line organizations that have been designated to perform the specific functions under subsections (d) and (e), and the specific functions for which each such line organization has been assigned primary responsibility.
(xvii) A summary of the reports received using the mechanism for authorized reporting established under section 3373b of this title.
(2) Form
(l) Semiannual briefings
(1) Requirement
(2) First briefing
(3) Subsequent briefings
(4) Instances in which data was not shared
(m) Task Force termination
(n) DefinitionsIn this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committeesThe term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:
(A) The Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(B) The Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(C) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(D) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(E) The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(F) The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional defense committees
(3) Congressional intelligence committees
(4) Congressional leadershipThe term “congressional leadership” means—
(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(5) Intelligence community
(6) Line organization
(7) Transmedium objects or devicesThe term “transmedium objects or devices” means objects or devices that are—
(A) observed to transition between space and the atmosphere, or between the atmosphere and bodies of water; and
(B) not immediately identifiable.
(8) Unidentified anomalous phenomenaThe term “unidentified anomalous phenomena” means—
(A) airborne objects that are not immediately identifiable;
(B) transmedium objects or devices; and
(C) submerged objects or devices that are not immediately identifiable and that display behavior or performance characteristics suggesting that the objects or devices may be related to the objects described in subparagraph (A).
(Pub. L. 117–81, div. A, title XVI, § 1683, Dec. 27, 2021, 135 Stat. 2118; Pub. L. 117–263, div. A, title XVI, § 1673(c), div. F, title LXVIII, § 6802(a), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 2961, 3586; Pub. L. 118–31, div. G, title III, § 7341, Dec. 22, 2023, 137 Stat. 1062.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3373

§ 3373a. Support for and oversight of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force
(a) Availability of data on unidentified aerial phenomena
(b) Quarterly reports
(1) In general
(2) Contents
Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(A) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during the period covered by the report.
(B) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during a period other than the period covered by the report but were not included in an earlier report.
(3) Form
(c) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:
(A) The congressional intelligence committees.
(B) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
(2) Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force
(Pub. L. 117–103, div. X, title IV, § 413, Mar. 15, 2022, 136 Stat. 977.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3373a

§ 3373b. Unidentified anomalous phenomena reporting procedures
(a) Mechanism for authorized reporting
(1) EstablishmentThe Secretary of Defense, acting through the head of the Office and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish a secure mechanism for authorized reporting of—
(A) any event relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena; and
(B) any activity or program by a department or agency of the Federal Government or a contractor of such a department or agency relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena, including with respect to material retrieval, material analysis, reverse engineering, research and development, detection and tracking, developmental or operational testing, and security protections and enforcement.
(2) Protection of systems, programs, and activity
(3) Administration
(4) Sharing of information
(A) Prompt sharing within Office
(B) Congressional notification
(5) Initial report and publicationNot later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, the Secretary, acting through the head of the Office and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall—
(A) submit to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees, and the congressional leadership a report detailing the mechanism for authorized reporting established under paragraph (1); and
(B) issue clear public guidance for how to securely access the mechanism for authorized reporting.
(b) Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures
(1) Authorized disclosuresAn authorized disclosure—
(A) shall not be subject to a nondisclosure agreement entered into by the individual who makes the disclosure;
(B) shall be deemed to comply with any regulation or order issued under the authority of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information) or chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.); and
(C) is not a violation of section 798 of title 18 or other provision of law relating to the disclosure of information.
(2) Prohibition on reprisals
(A) Protection
(B) Procedures
(3) Nondisclosure agreements
(A) Identification
(B) Submission to CongressThe head of the Office shall—
(i) make the records compiled under subparagraph (A) accessible to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees, and the congressional leadership; and
(ii) not later than September 30, 2023, and at least once each fiscal year thereafter through fiscal year 2026, provide to such committees and congressional leadership briefings and reports on such records.
(c) Omitted
(d) DefinitionsIn this section:
(1) The term “authorized disclosure” means a report of any information through, and in compliance with, the mechanism for authorized reporting established pursuant to subsection (a)(1).
(2) The term “congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning given such term in section 3003 of this title.
(3) The term “congressional leadership” means—
(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(4) The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3003 of this title.
(5) The term “nondisclosure agreement” means any written or oral nondisclosure agreement, order, or other instrumentality or means entered into by an individual that could be interpreted as a legal constraint on the individual making an authorized disclosure.
(6) The term “Office” means the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office established pursuant to section 3373(a) of this title.
(7) The term “personnel action” has the meaning given such term in section 3234(a) of this title.
(8) The term “unidentified anomalous phenomena” has the meaning given such term in section 3373(n) of this title.
(Pub. L. 117–263, div. A, title XVI, § 1673, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 2959.)

CITE AS: 50 USC 3373b