Section 362(a)(1) of the House amendment adopts the provision contained in the Senate amendment enjoining the commencement or continuation of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case. The provision is beneficial and interacts with section 362(a)(6), which also covers assessment, to prevent harassment of the debtor with respect to pre-petition claims.
Section 362(a)(7) contains a provision contained in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House. The differing provision in the Senate amendment was rejected. It is not possible that a debt owing to the debtor may be offset against an interest in the debtor.
Section 362(a)(8) is new. The provision stays the commencement or continuation of any proceeding concerning the debtor before the U.S. Tax Court.
Section 362(span)(4) indicates that the stay under section 362(a)(1) does not apply to affect the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce the governmental unit’s police or regulatory power. This section is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to permit governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not to apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or property of the estate.
Section 362(span)(6) of the House amendment adopts a provision contained in the Senate amendment restricting the exception to the automatic stay with respect to setoffs to permit only the setoff of mutual debts and claims. Traditionally, the right of setoff has been limited to mutual debts and claims and the lack of the clarifying term “mutual” in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House created an unintentional ambiguity. Section 362(span)(7) of the House amendment permits the issuance of a notice of tax deficiency. The House amendment rejects section 362(span)(7) in the Senate amendment. It would have permitted a particular governmental unit to obtain a pecuniary advantage without a hearing on the merits contrary to the exceptions contained in sections 362(span)(4) and (5).
Section 362(d) of the House amendment represents a compromise between comparable provisions in the House bill and Senate amendment. Under section 362(d)(1) of the House amendment, the court may terminate, annul, modify, or condition the automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of a secured party. It is anticipated that the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will provide that those hearings will receive priority on the calendar. Under section 362(d)(2) the court may alternatively terminate, annul, modify, or condition the automatic stay for cause including inadequate protection for the creditor. The court shall grant relief from the stay if there is no equity and it is not necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor.
The latter requirement is contained in section 362(d)(2). This section is intended to solve the problem of real property mortgage foreclosures of property where the bankruptcy petition is filed on the eve of foreclosure. The section is not intended to apply if the business of the debtor is managing or leasing real property, such as a hotel operation, even though the debtor has no equity if the property is necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor. Similarly, if the debtor does have an equity in the property, there is no requirement that the property be sold under section 363 of title 11 as would have been required by the Senate amendment.
Section 362(e) of the House amendment represents a modification of provisions in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House and the Senate amendment to make clear that a final hearing must be commenced within 30 days after a preliminary hearing is held to determine whether a creditor will be entitled to relief from the automatic stay. In order to insure that those hearings will in fact occur within such 30-day period, it is anticipated that the rules of bankruptcy procedure provide that such final hearings receive priority on the court calendar.
Section 362(g) places the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor’s equity in collateral on the party requesting relief from the automatic stay and the burden on other issues on the debtor.
An amendment has been made to section 362(span) to permit the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to commence an action to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust. The commencement of such an action is necessary for tax purposes. The section is not intended to permit the continuation of such an action after it is commenced nor is the section to be construed to entitle the Secretary to take possession in lieu of foreclosure.
Automatic stay: Sections 362(span)(8) and (9) contained in the Senate amendment are largely deleted in the House amendment. Those provisions add to the list of actions not stayed (a) jeopardy assessments, (span) other assessments, and (c) the issuance of deficiency notices. In the House amendment, jeopardy assessments against property which ceases to be property of the estate is already authorized by section 362(c)(1). Other assessments are specifically stayed under section 362(a)(6), while the issuance of a deficiency notice is specifically permitted. Stay of the assessment and the permission to issue a statutory notice of a tax deficiency will permit the debtor to take his personal tax case to the Tax Court, if the bankruptcy judge authorizes him to do so (as explained more fully in the discussion of section 505).
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
The action commenced by the party seeking relief from the stay is referred to as a motion to make it clear that at the expedited hearing under subsection (e), and at hearings on relief from the stay, the only issue will be the lack of adequate protection, the debtor’s equity in the property, and the necessity of the property to an effective reorganization of the debtor, or the existence of other cause for relief from the stay. This hearing will not be the appropriate time at which to bring in other issues, such as counterclaims against the creditor, which, although relevant to the question of the amount of the debt, concern largely collateral or unrelated matters. This approach is consistent with that taken in cases such as In re Essex Properties, Ltd., 430 F.Supp. 1112 (N.D.Cal.1977), that an action seeking relief from the stay is not the assertion of a claim which would give rise to the right or obligation to assert counterclaims. Those counterclaims are not to be handled in the summary fashion that the preliminary hearing under this provision will be. Rather, they will be the subject of more complete proceedings by the trustee to recover property of the estate or to object to the allowance of a claim. However, this would not preclude the party seeking continuance of the stay from presenting evidence on the existence of claims which the court may consider in exercising its discretion. What is precluded is a determination of such collateral claims on the merits at the hearing.
Paragraph (7) [of subsec. (a)] stays setoffs of mutual debts and credits between the debtor and creditors. As with all other paragraphs of subsection (a), this paragraph does not affect the right of creditors. It simply stays its enforcement pending an orderly examination of the debtor’s and creditors’ rights.
Subsection (c) governs automatic termination of the stay. Subsections (d) through (g) govern termination of the stay by the court on the request of a party in interest. Subsection (d) requires the court, on request of a party in interest, to grant relief from the stay, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning the stay, for cause. The lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of the party requesting relief from the stay is one cause for relief, but is not the only cause. As noted above, a desire to permit an action to proceed to completion in another tribunal may provide another cause. Other causes might include the lack of any connection with or interference with the pending bankruptcy case. For example, a divorce or child custody proceeding involving the debtor may bear no relation to the bankruptcy case. In that case, it should not be stayed. A probate proceeding in which the debtor is the executor or administrator of another’s estate usually will not be related to the bankruptcy case, and should not be stayed. Generally, proceedings in which the debtor is a fiduciary, or involving postpetition activities of the debtor, need not be stayed because they bear no relationship to the purpose of the automatic stay, which is debtor protection from his creditors. The facts of each request will determine whether relief is appropriate under the circumstances.
Subsection (e) provides a protection for secured creditors that is not available under present law. The subsection sets a time certain within which the bankruptcy court must rule on the adequacy of protection provided of the secured creditor’s interest. If the court does not rule within 30 days from a request for relief from the stay, the stay is automatically terminated with respect to the property in question. In order to accommodate more complex cases, the subsection permits the court to make a preliminary ruling after a preliminary hearing. After a preliminary hearing, the court may continue the stay only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from the stay will prevail at the final hearing. Because the stay is essentially an injunction, the three stages of the stay may be analogized to the three stages of an injunction. The filing of the petition which gives rise to the automatic stay is similar to a temporary restraining order. The preliminary hearing is similar to the hearing on a preliminary injunction, and the final hearing and order is similar to a permanent injunction. The main difference lies in which party must bring the issue before the court. While in the injunction setting, the party seeking the injunction must prosecute the action, in proceedings for relief from the automatic stay, the enjoined party must move. The difference does not, however, shift the burden of proof. Subsection (g) leaves that burden on the party opposing relief from the stay (that is, on the party seeking continuance of the injunction) on the issue of adequate protection.
At the expedited hearing under subsection (e), and at all hearings on relief from the stay, the only issue will be the claim of the creditor and the lack of adequate protection or existence of other cause for relief from the stay. This hearing will not be the appropriate time at which to bring in other issues, such as counterclaims against the creditor on largely unrelated matters. Those counterclaims are not to be handled in the summary fashion that the preliminary hearing under this provision will be. Rather, they will be the subject of more complete proceedings by the trustees to recover property of the estate or to object to the allowance of a claim.
Section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (span), is classified to section 78eee(a)(3) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.
The Social Security Act, referred to in subsec. (span)(2)(D) to (G), (28), is act Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620. Titles IV, XI, and XVIII of the Act are classified generally to subchapters IV (§ 601 et seq.), XI (§ 1301 et seq.), and XVIII (§ 1395 et seq.), respectively, of chapter 7 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. Sections 464, 466, and 1128B of the Act are classified to sections 664, 666, and 1320a–7span, respectively, of Title 42. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1305 of Title 42 and Tables.
The National Housing Act, referred in subsec. (span)(8), is act June 27, 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246, which is classified principally to chapter 13 (§ 1701 et seq.) of Title 12, Banks and Banking. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1701 of Title 12 and Tables.
The Higher Education Act of 1965, referred to in subsec. (span)(16), is Puspan. L. 89–329, Nov. 8, 1965, 79 Stat. 1219, which is classified generally to chapter 28 (§ 1001 et seq.) of Title 20, Education. Section 435(j) of the Act is classified to section 1085(j) of Title 20. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1001 of Title 20 and Tables.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (span)(19), is classified generally to Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
Section 408(span)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (span)(19)(A), is classified to section 1108(span)(1) of Title 29, Labor.
2020—Subsec. (span)(29). Puspan. L. 116–189 added par. (29).
2010—Subsec. (a)(8). Puspan. L. 111–327, § 2(a)(12)(A), substituted “tax liability of a debtor that is a corporation” for “corporate debtor’s tax liability”.
Subsec. (c)(3). Puspan. L. 111–327, § 2(a)(12)(B)(i), inserted “a” after “against” in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (c)(4)(A)(i). Puspan. L. 111–327, § 2(a)(12)(B)(ii), inserted “under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal” after “refiled”.
Subsec. (d)(4). Puspan. L. 111–327, § 2(a)(12)(C), substituted “hinder, or” for “hinder, and” in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (l)(2). Puspan. L. 111–327, § 2(a)(12)(D), substituted “nonbankruptcy” for “nonbankrupcty”.
2006—Subsec. (span)(6), (7). Puspan. L. 109–390, § 5(a)(2)(A), added pars. (6) and (7) and struck out former pars. (6) and (7) which read as follows:
“(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity contracts, as defined in section 761 of this title, forward contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section 741 of this title, that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 101, 741, or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this title, arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts;
“(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a repo participant or financial participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repurchase agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 741 or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 741 of this title, arising out of repurchase agreements against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such repo participant or financial participant to margin, guarantee, secure or settle repurchase agreements;”.
Subsec. (span)(12). Puspan. L. 109–304, § 17(span)(1)(A), substituted “chapter 537 of title 46 or section 109(h) of title 49” for “section 207 or title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936”.
Subsec. (span)(13). Puspan. L. 109–304, § 17(span)(1)(B), substituted “chapter 537 of title 46” for “section 207 or title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936”.
Subsec. (span)(17). Puspan. L. 109–390, § 5(a)(2)(B), added par. (17) and struck out former par. (17) which read as follows: “under subsection (a), of the setoff by a swap participant or financial participant of a mutual debt and claim under or in connection with one or more swap agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment or other transfer of property due from the debtor under or in connection with any swap agreement against any payment due to the debtor from the swap participant or financial participant under or in connection with any swap agreement or against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such swap participant or financial participant to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle any swap agreement;”.
Subsec. (span)(27). Puspan. L. 109–390, § 5(a)(2)(C), added par. (27) and struck out former par. (27) which read as follows: “under subsection (a), of the setoff by a master netting agreement participant of a mutual debt and claim under or in connection with one or more master netting agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment or other transfer of property due from the debtor under or in connection with such agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements against any payment due to the debtor from such master netting agreement participant under or in connection with such agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements or against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such master netting agreement participant to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle such agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements, to the extent that such participant is eligible to exercise such offset rights under paragraph (6), (7), or (17) for each individual contract covered by the master netting agreement in issue; and”.
2005—Subsec. (a)(8). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 709, substituted “a corporate debtor’s tax liability for a taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable period ending before the date of the order for relief under this title” for “the debtor”.
Subsec. (span)(2). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 214, added par. (2) and struck out former par. (2) which read as follows: “under subsection (a) of this section—
“(A) of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding for—
“(i) the establishment of paternity; or
“(ii) the establishment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support; or
“(B) of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate;”.
Subsec. (span)(6). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 907(d)(1)(A), (o)(1), substituted “financial institution, financial participant,” for “financial institutions,” in two places and inserted “, pledged to, under the control of,” after “held by”.
Subsec. (span)(7). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 907(d)(1)(B), (o)(2), inserted “or financial participant” after “repo participant” in two places and “, pledged to, under the control of,” after “held by”.
Subsec. (span)(17). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 907(d)(1)(C), added par. (17) and struck out former par. (17) which read as follows: “under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a swap participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with any swap agreement that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment due from the debtor under or in connection with any swap agreement against any payment due to the debtor from the swap participant under or in connection with any swap agreement or against cash, securities, or other property of the debtor held by or due from such swap participant to guarantee, secure or settle any swap agreement;”.
Subsec. (span)(18). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 1225, amended par. (18) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (18) read as follows: “under subsection (a) of the creation or perfection of a statutory lien for an ad valorem property tax imposed by the District of Columbia, or a political subdivision of a State, if such tax comes due after the filing of the petition;”.
Subsec. (span)(19). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 224(span), added par. (19).
Subsec. (span)(20), (21). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 303(span), added pars. (20) and (21).
Subsec. (span)(22) to (24). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 311(a), added pars. (22) to (24).
Subsec. (span)(25). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 401(span), added par. (25).
Subsec. (span)(26). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 718, added par. (26).
Subsec. (span)(27). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 907(d)(1)(D), added par. (27).
Subsec. (span)(28). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 1106, added par. (28).
Subsec. (c). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 305(1)(A), substituted “(e), (f), and (h)” for “(e), and (f)” in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (c)(3), (4). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 302, added pars. (3) and (4).
Subsec. (d). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 303(a), added par. (4) and concluding provisions.
Subsec. (d)(3). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 444(1), inserted “or 30 days after the court determines that the debtor is subject to this paragraph, whichever is later” after “90-day period)” in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (d)(3)(B). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 444(2), added subpar. (B) and struck out former subpar. (B) which read as follows: “the debtor has commenced monthly payments to each creditor whose claim is secured by such real estate (other than a claim secured by a judgment lien or by an unmatured statutory lien), which payments are in an amount equal to interest at a current fair market rate on the value of the creditor’s interest in the real estate; or”.
Subsec. (e). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 320, designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).
Subsec. (h). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 305(1)(C), added subsec. (h). Former subsec. (h) redesignated (k).
Subsecs. (i), (j). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 106(f), added subsecs. (i) and (j).
Subsec. (k). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 441(1), designated existing provisions as par. (1), substituted “Except as provided in paragraph (2), an” for “An”, and added par. (2).
Puspan. L. 109–8, § 305(1)(B), redesignated subsec. (h) as (k).
Subsecs. (l), (m). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 311(span), added subsecs. (l) and (m).
Subsec. (n). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 441(2), added subsec. (n).
Subsec. (o). Puspan. L. 109–8, § 907(d)(2), added subsec. (o).
1998—Subsec. (span)(4), (5). Puspan. L. 105–277 added par. (4) and struck out former pars. (4) and (5) which read as follows:
“(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power;
“(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power;”.
1994—Subsecs. (a), (span). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(7)(A), (B)(i), struck out “(15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3))” after “Act of 1970” in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (span)(2). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 304(span), amended par. (2) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (2) read as follows: “under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate;”.
Subsec. (span)(3). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 204(a), inserted “, or to maintain or continue the perfection of,” after “to perfect”.
Subsec. (span)(6). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 501(span)(2)(A), substituted “section 761” for “section 761(4)”, “section 741” for “section 741(7)”, “section 101, 741, or 761” for “section 101(34), 741(5), or 761(15)”, and “section 101 or 741” for “section 101(35) or 741(8)”.
Subsec. (span)(7). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 501(span)(2)(B), substituted “section 741 or 761” for “section 741(5) or 761(15)” and “section 741” for “section 741(8)”.
Subsec. (span)(9). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 116, amended par. (9) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (9) read as follows: “under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency;”.
Subsec. (span)(10). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(7)(B)(ii), struck out “or” at end.
Subsec. (span)(12). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(7)(B)(iii), substituted “section 31325 of title 46” for “the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.)” and struck out “(46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively)” after “Act, 1936”.
Subsec. (span)(13). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(7)(B)(iv), substituted “section 31325 of title 46” for “the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.)” and struck out “(46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively)” after “Act, 1936” and “or” at end.
Subsec. (span)(14). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(7)(B)(vii), amended par. (14) relating to the setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with a swap agreement by substituting “; or” for period at end, redesignating par. (14) as (17), and inserting it after par. (16).
Subsec. (span)(15). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(7)(B)(v), struck out “or” at end.
Subsec. (span)(16). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(7)(B)(vi), struck out “(20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.)” after “Act of 1965” and substituted semicolon for period at end.
Subsec. (span)(17). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(7)(B)(vii)(II), (III), redesignated par. (14) relating to the setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with a swap agreement as (17) and inserted it after par. (16).
Subsec. (span)(18). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 401, added par. (18).
Subsec. (d)(3). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 218(span), added par. (3).
Subsec. (e). Puspan. L. 103–394, § 101, in last sentence substituted “concluded” for “commenced” and inserted before period at end “, unless the 30-day period is extended with the consent of the parties in interest or for a specific time which the court finds is required by compelling circumstances”.
1990—Subsec. (span)(6). Puspan. L. 101–311, § 202, inserted reference to sections 101(34) and 101(35) of this title.
Subsec. (span)(12). Puspan. L. 101–508, § 3007(a)(1)(A), which directed the striking of “or” after “State law;”, could not be executed because of a prior amendment by Puspan. L. 101–311. See below.
Puspan. L. 101–311, § 102(1), struck out “or” after “State law;”.
Subsec. (span)(13). Puspan. L. 101–508, § 3007(a)(1)(B), which directed the substitution of a semicolon for period at end, could not be executed because of a prior amendment by Puspan. L. 101–311. See below.
Puspan. L. 101–311, § 102(2), substituted “; or” for period at end.
Subsec. (span)(14) to (16). Puspan. L. 101–508, § 3007(a)(1)(C), added pars. (14) to (16). Notwithstanding directory language adding pars. (14) to (16) immediately following par. (13), pars. (14) to (16) were added after par. (14), as added by Puspan. L. 101–311, to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
Puspan. L. 101–311, § 102(3), added par. (14) relating to the setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with a swap agreement. Notwithstanding directory language adding par. (14) at end of subsec. (span), par. (14) was added after par. (13) to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
1986—Subsec. (span). Puspan. L. 99–509 inserted sentence at end.
Subsec. (span)(6). Puspan. L. 99–554, § 283(d)(1), substituted “, financial institutions” for “financial institution,” in two places.
Subsec. (span)(9). Puspan. L. 99–554, § 283(d)(2), (3), struck out “or” at end of first par. (9) and redesignated as par. (10) the second par. (9) relating to leases of nonresidential property, which was added by section 363(span) of Puspan. L. 98–353.
Subsec. (span)(10). Puspan. L. 99–554, § 283(d)(3), (4), redesignated as par. (10) the second par. (9) relating to leases of nonresidential property, added by section 363(span) of Puspan. L. 99–353, and substituted “property; or” for “property.”. Former par. (10) redesignated (11).
Subsec. (span)(11). Puspan. L. 99–554, § 283(d)(3), redesignated former par. (10) as (11).
Subsec. (span)(12), (13). Puspan. L. 99–509 added pars. (12) and (13).
Subsec. (c)(2)(C). Puspan. L. 99–554, § 257(j), inserted reference to chapter 12 of this title.
1984—Subsec. (a)(1). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 441(a)(1), inserted “action or” after “other”.
Subsec. (a)(3). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 441(a)(2), inserted “or to exercise control over property of the estate”.
Subsec. (span)(3). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 441(span)(1), inserted “or to the extent that such act is accomplished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) of this title”.
Subsec. (span)(6). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 441(span)(2), inserted “or due from” after “held by” and “financial institution,” after “stockbroker” in two places, and substituted “secure, or settle commodity contracts” for “or secure commodity contracts”.
Subsec. (span)(7) to (9). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 441(span)(3), (4), in par. (8) as redesignated by Puspan. L. 98–353, § 392, substituted “the” for “said” and struck out “or” the last place it appeared which probably meant “or” after “units;” that was struck out by Puspan. L. 98–353, § 363(span)(1); and, in par. (9), relating to notices of deficiencies, as redesignated by Puspan. L. 98–353, § 392, substituted a semicolon for the period.
Puspan. L. 98–353, § 392, added par. (7) and redesignated former pars. (7) and (8) as (8) and (9), respectively.
Puspan. L. 98–353, § 363(span), struck out “or” at end of par. (7), substituted “; or” for the period at end of par. (8), and added par. (9) relating to leases of nonresidential property.
Subsec. (span)(10). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 441(span)(5), added par. (10).
Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 441(c), substituted “or” for “and”.
Subsec. (d)(2). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 441(d), inserted “under subsection (a) of this section” after “property”.
Subsec. (e). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 441(e), inserted “the conclusion of” after “pending” and substituted “The court shall order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion of the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the conclusion of such final hearing. If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing, then such final hearing shall be commenced not later than thirty days after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing.” for “If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing—
“(1) the court shall order such stay so continued if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section; and
“(2) such final hearing shall be commenced within thirty days after such preliminary hearing.”
Subsec. (f). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 441(f), substituted “Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or” for “The court,”.
Subsec. (h). Puspan. L. 98–353, § 304, added subsec. (h).
1982—Subsec. (a). Puspan. L. 97–222, § 3(a), inserted “, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)),” after “this title” in provisions preceding par. (1).
Subsec. (span). Puspan. L. 97–222, § 3(span), inserted “, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)),” after “this title” in provisions preceding par. (1).
Subsec. (span)(6). Puspan. L. 97–222, § 3(c), substituted provisions that the filing of a bankruptcy petition would not operate as a stay, under subsec. (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity, forward, or securities contracts that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin or settlement payment arising out of commodity, forward, or securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by any of the above agents to margin, guarantee, or secure commodity, forward, or securities contracts, for provisions that such filing would not operate as a stay under subsection (a)(7) of this section, of the setoff of any mutual debt and claim that are commodity futures contracts, forward commodity contracts, leverage transactions, options, warrants, rights to purchase or sell commodity futures contracts or securities, or options to purchase or sell commodities or securities.
Amendment by Puspan. L. 109–390 not applicable to any cases commenced under this title or to appointments made under any Federal or State law, before Dec. 12, 2006, see section 7 of Puspan. L. 109–390, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
Amendment by Puspan. L. 109–8 effective 180 days after Apr. 20, 2005, and not applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title before such effective date, except as otherwise provided, see section 1501 of Puspan. L. 109–8, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
Amendment by Puspan. L. 103–394 effective Oct. 22, 1994, and not applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title before Oct. 22, 1994, see section 702 of Puspan. L. 103–394, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
Puspan. L. 101–508, title III, § 3007(a)(3), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–28, provided that:
Puspan. L. 101–508, title III, § 3008, Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–29, provided that the amendments made by subtitle A (§§ 3001–3008) of title III of Puspan. L. 101–508, amending this section, sections 541 and 1328 of this title, and sections 1078, 1078–1, 1078–7, 1085, 1088, and 1091 of Title 20, Education, and provisions set out as a note under section 1078–1 of Title 20, were to cease to be effective Oct. 1, 1996, prior to repeal by Puspan. L. 102–325, title XV, § 1558, July 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 841.
Amendment by section 257 of Puspan. L. 99–554 effective 30 days after Oct. 27, 1986, but not applicable to cases commenced under this title before that date, see section 302(a), (c)(1) of Puspan. L. 99–554, set out as a note under section 581 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
Amendment by section 283 of Puspan. L. 99–554 effective 30 days after Oct. 27, 1986, see section 302(a) of Puspan. L. 99–554.
Puspan. L. 99–509, title V, § 5001(span), Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1912, provided that:
Amendment by Puspan. L. 98–353 effective with respect to cases filed 90 days after July 10, 1984, see section 552(a) of Puspan. L. 98–353, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
Puspan. L. 99–509, title V, § 5001(a), Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1911, directed Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of Commerce, before July 1, 1989, to submit reports to Congress on the effects of amendments to 11 U.S.C. 362 by this subsection.