This chapter, referred to in subsecs. (a)(2) and (g)(2), was in the original “the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974”, and “this Act”, respectively, meaning Puspan. L. 93–438, Oct. 11, 1974, 88 Stat. 1233, which enacted this chapter, amended sections 5313 to 5316 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, repealed sections 2031 and 2032 of this title, and enacted provisions set out as notes under section 5801 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 5801 of this title and Tables.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, referred to in subsec. (g), is act Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, as added by act Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, § 1, 68 Stat. 919, which is classified principally to chapter 23 (§ 2011 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2011 of this title and Tables.

1986—Subsec. (h). Puspan. L. 99–386 struck out subsec. (h) which related to quarterly reports on compliance with equal employment requirements for grades GS–11 or above.

1977—Subsec. (h). Puspan. L. 95–209 added subsec. (h).

1975—Subsec. (a). Puspan. L. 94–79, § 201, designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added pars. (2) to (5).

Subsec. (c). Puspan. L. 94–79, §§ 202, 203, provided for appointment for remainder of term where vacancy occurs prior to expiration of term of predecessor appointee and designated July 1, 1975, as commencement date of initial appointees for purpose of determining expiration date of terms of office.

Energy Research and Development Administration terminated and functions vested by law in Administrator thereof transferred to Secretary of Energy (unless otherwise specifically provided) by sections 7151(a) and 7293 of this title.

Puspan. L. 100–202, § 101(d) [title III, § 300], Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1329–104, 1329–121, and Puspan. L. 100–203, title V, § 5062, Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1330–251, provided that:

Puspan. L. 97–415, § 13, Jan. 4, 1983, 96 Stat. 2074, provided that:

Puspan. L. 96–295, title III, § 301, June 30, 1980, 94 Stat. 789, directed Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 90 days of June 30, 1980, to promulgate regulations providing for timely notification to the Governor of any State prior to the transport of nuclear waste, including spent nuclear fuel, to, through, or across the boundaries of such State, and provided that such notification requirement would not apply to nuclear waste in such quantities and of such types as the Commission specifically determined did not pose a potentially significant hazard to the health and safety of the public.

Puspan. L. 95–601, § 7, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2950, directed Commission to undertake a comprehensive review of the existing process for selection and training of members of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards, report to Congress on findings of such review by Jan. 1, 1979, and revise such selection and training process as appropriate, based on such findings.

Puspan. L. 94–79, title II, § 201, Aug. 9, 1975, 89 Stat. 413, provided in part that: “The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall not license any shipments by air transport of plutonium in any form, whether exports, imports or domestic shipments: Provided, however, That any plutonium in any form contained in a medical device designed for individual human application is not subject to this restriction. This restriction shall be in force until the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has certified to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress that a safe container has been developed and tested which will not rupture under crash and blast-testing equivalent to the crash and explosion of a high-flying aircraft.”

For transfer of certain functions from Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Chairman thereof, see Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1980, 45 F.R. 40561, 94 Stat. 3585, set out below.

Prepared by the President and submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives in Congress assembled March 27, 1980,1

Section 1. (a) Those functions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”, concerned with:

(1) policy formulation;

(2) rulemaking, as defined in section 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, except that those matters set forth in 553(a)(2) and (span) which do not pertain to policy formulation orders or adjudications shall be reserved to the Chairman of the Commission;

(3) orders and adjudications, as defined in section 551 (6) and (7) of Title 5 of the United States Code;

shall remain vested in the Commission. The Commission may determine by majority vote, in an area of doubt, whether any matter, action, question or area of inquiry pertains to one of these functions. The performance of any portion of these functions may be delegated by the Commission to a member of the Commission, including the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, hereinafter referred to as the “Chairman”, and to the staff through the Chairman.

(span)(1) With respect to the following officers or successor officers duly established by statute or by the Commission, the Chairman shall initiate the appointment, subject to the approval of the Commission; and the Chairman or a member of the Commission may initiate an action for removal, subject to the approval of the Commission:

(i) Executive Director for Operations,

(ii) General Counsel,

(iii) Secretary of the Commission,

(iv) Director of the Office of Policy Evaluation,

(v) Director of the Office of Inspector and Auditor,

(vi) Chairman, Vice Chairman, Executive Secretary, and Members of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel,

(vii) Chairman, Vice Chairman and Members of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel.

(2) With respect to the following officers or successor officers duly established by statute or by the Commission, the Chairman, after consultation with the Executive Director for Operations, shall initiate the appointment, subject to the approval of the Commission, and the Chairman, or a member of the Commission may initiate an action for removal, subject to the approval of the Commission:

(i) Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,

(ii) Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,

(iii) Director of Nuclear Regulatory Research,

(iv) Director of Inspection and Enforcement,

(v) Director of Standards Development.

(3) The Chairman or a member of the Commission shall initiate the appointment of the Members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, subject to the approval of the Commission. The provisions for appointment of the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and the term of the members shall not be affected by the provisions of this Reorganization Plan.

(4) The Commission shall delegate the function of appointing, removing and supervising the staff of the following offices or successor offices to the respective heads of such offices: General Counsel, Secretary of the Commission, Office of Policy Evaluation, Office of Inspector and Auditor. The Commission shall delegate the functions of appointing, removing and supervising the staff of the following panels and committee to the respective Chairmen thereof: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel and Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

(c) Each member of the Commission shall continue to appoint, remove and supervise the personnel employed in his or her immediate office.

(d) The Commission shall act as provided by subsection 201(a)(1) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841(a)(1)) in the performance of its functions as described in subsections (a) and (span) of this section.

Sec. 2. (a) All other functions of the Commission, not specified by Section 1 of this Reorganization Plan, are hereby transferred to the Chairman. The Chairman shall be the official spokesman for the Commission, and shall appoint, supervise, and remove, without further action by the Commission, the Directors and staff of the Office of Public Affairs and the Office of Congressional Relations. The Chairman may consult with the Commission as he deems appropriate in exercising this appointment function.

(span) The Chairman shall also be the principal executive officer of the Commission, and shall be responsible to the Commission for developing policy planning and guidance for consideration by the Commission; shall be responsible to the Commission for assuring that the Executive Director for Operations and the staff of the Commission (other than the officers and staff referred to in sections (1)(span)(4), (1)(c) and (2)(a) of this Reorganization Plan) are responsive to the requirements of the Commission in the performance of its functions; shall determine the use and expenditure of funds of the Commission, in accordance with the distribution of appropriated funds according to major programs and purposes approved by the Commission; shall present to the Commission for its consideration the proposals and estimates set forth in subsection (3) of this paragraph; and shall be responsible for the following functions, which he shall delegate, subject to his direction and supervision, to the Executive Director for Operations unless otherwise provided by this Reorganization Plan:

(1) administrative functions of the Commission;

(2) distribution of business among such personnel and among administrative units and offices of the Commission;

(3) preparation of

(i) proposals for the reorganization of the major offices within the Commission;

(ii) the budget estimate for the Commission; and

(iii) the proposed distribution of appropriated funds according to major programs and purposes.

(4) appointing and removing without any further action by the Commission, all officers and employees under the Commission other than those whose appointment and removal are specifically provided for by subsections 1 (span), (c) and 2(a) of this Reorganization Plan.

(c) The Chairman as principal executive officer and the Executive Director for Operations shall be governed by the general policies of the Commission and by such regulatory decisions, findings, and determinations, including those for reorganization proposals, budget revisions and distribution of appropriated funds, as the Commission may by law, including this Plan, be authorized to make. The Chairman and the Executive Director for Operations, through the Chairman, shall be responsible for insuring that the Commission is fully and currently informed about matters within its functions.

Sec. 3. (a) Notwithstanding sections 1 and 2 of this Reorganization Plan, there are hereby transferred to the Chairman all the functions vested in the Commission pertaining to an emergency concerning a particular facility or materials licensed or regulated by the Commission, including the functions of declaring, responding, issuing orders, determining specific policies, advising the civil authorities and the public, directing, and coordinating actions relative to such emergency incident.

(span) The Chairman may delegate the authority to perform such emergency functions, in whole or in part, to any of the other members of the Commission. Such authority may also be delegated or redelegated, in whole or in part, to the staff of the Commission.

(c) In acting under this section, the Chairman, or other member of the Commission delegated authority under subsection (span), shall conform to the policy guidelines of the Commission. To the maximum extent possible under the emergency conditions, the Chairman or other member of the Commission delegated authority under subsection (span), shall inform the Commission of actions taken relative to the emergency.

(d) Following the conclusion of the emergency, the Chairman, or the member of the Commission delegated the emergency functions under subsection (span), shall render a complete and timely report to the Commission on the actions taken during the emergency.

Sec. 4. (a) The Chairman may make such delegations and provide for such reporting as the Chairman deems necessary, subject to provisions of law and this Reorganization Plan. Any officer or employee under the Commission may communicate directly to the Commission, or to any member of the Commission, whenever in the view of such officer or employee a critical problem or public health and safety or common defense and security is not being properly addressed.

(span) The Executive Director for Operations shall report for all matters to the Chairman.

(c) The function of the Directors of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, and Nuclear Regulatory Research of reporting directly to the Commission is hereby transferred so that such officers report to the Executive Director for Operations. The function of receiving such reports is hereby transferred from the Commission to the Executive Director for Operations.

(d) The heads of the Commission level offices or successor offices, of General Counsel, Secretary to the Commission, Office of Policy Evaluation, Office of Inspector and Auditor, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel and Appeal Panel, and Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards shall continue to report directly to the Commission and the Commission shall continue to receive such reports.

Sec. 5. The provisions of this Reorganization Plan shall take effect October 1, 1980, or at such earlier time or times as the President shall specify, but no sooner than the earliest time allowable under Section 906 of Title 5 of the United States Code.

To the Congress of the United States:

I am submitting herewith to the Congress Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, under authority vested in me by the Reorganization Act of 1977 (Chapter 9 of Title 5 of the United States Code). The Plan is designed to strengthen management of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to foster safety in all of the agency’s activities.

The need for more effective management of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been amply demonstrated over the past year. The accident at Three Mile Island one year ago revealed serious shortcomings in the agency’s ability to respond effectively during a crisis. The lessons learned from that accident go beyond crisis management, however. They provide the impetus for improving the effectiveness of all aspects of the government regulation of nuclear energy.

In my statement of December 7, 1979, I responded to the recommendations of my Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island and set forth steps now being taken to address those recommendations. I stated that I would send to Congress a Reorganization Plan to strengthen the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s ability to regulate nuclear safety. I am submitting that Plan today.

The Plan clarifies the duties of the Chairman as principal executive officer. In addition to directing the day-to-day operations of the agency, the Chairman would take charge of the Commission’s response to nuclear emergencies and, as principal executive officer, would be guided by Commission policy and subject to Commission oversight.

Intensive investigations undertaken since the Three Mile Island accident have revealed management problems at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. These problems must be rectified if the Commission is to be a strong and effective safety regulator.

—My Commission, called the Kemeny Commission after its Chairman, Dr. John Kemeny, concluded that the underlying problem at Three Mile Island stemmed not from deficient equipment but rather from compounded human failures. This included the inability of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to pursue its safety mission effectively in view of its existing management policies and practices. The Kemeny Commission reported a lack of “closure” in the system to ensure that safety issues are raised, analyzed and resolved. Kemeny Commission members also concluded that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission relies too heavily on licensing, and pays insufficient attention to ensuring the safety of plants once they are in operation.

—During the course of its investigation, the Kemeny Commission found serious managerial problems at the top of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It noted that the Commissioners and the Chairman are unclear as to their respective roles. Uncertain, diffuse leadership of this kind leads to highly compartmentalized offices that operate with little or no effective guidance and little coordination.

—A recently completed independent study authorized and funded by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission itself also found serious fault with the Commission’s management and called for a major organizational overhaul. The report states that there is no authoritative manager but, instead, five equally responsible Commissioners who deal individually with office directors who, in turn, head their own “independent fiefdoms.”

—Likewise, a recent report of the General Accounting Office notes the failure of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to define either the authority of the Chairman or that of the Executive Director for Operations. The staff lacks policy guidance and top management leadership to set priorities and resolve safety issues. There are unreasonable delays in developing policies to guide the licensing and enforcement activities of the agency.

The central theme in all three of these studies is the failure of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to provide unified leadership and consistent direction of the agency’s activities. The present statutes contain conflicting and ambiguous provisions for managing the agency. Important corrective actions cannot or will not be taken by the Commission until the laws are changed. Failure to do so constitutes a continuing nuclear safety hazard.

The present Reorganization Plan would improve the effectiveness of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by giving the Chairman the powers he needs to ensure efficient and coherent management in a manner that preserves, in fact enhances, the commission form of organization.

Under the proposed Plan, the Commission would continue to be responsible for policy formulation, rulemaking and adjudication as functions which should have collegial deliberation. In addition, the Commission would review and approve proposals by the Chairman concerning key management actions such as personnel decisions affecting top positions which directly support Commission functions, the annual budget, and major staff reorganizations. In carrying out its role, the Commission would have the direct assistance of several Commission-level offices as well as the licensing board, the appeal panel, and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The Plan would not alter the present arrangement whereby the Commission, acting on majority vote, represents the ultimate authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and sets the framework within which the Chairman is to operate.

Under the Plan, the Chairman would act as the principal executive officer and spokesman for the Commission. To accomplish this, those functions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission not retained by the Commission would be vested in the Chairman, who is currently coequal with the Commissioners in all decisions and actions. The Chairman would be authorized to make appointments, on his own authority, to all positions not specified for Commission approval and would be responsible to the Commission for assuring staff support by the operating offices in meeting the needs of the Commission. The Executive Director for Operations would report directly to and receive his authority from the Chairman. Heads of operating offices would also report to the Chairman or, by delegation, to the Executive Director for Operations. Office heads would also be authorized to communicate directly with members of the Commission whenever an office head believed critical safety issues were not being addressed.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s ability to respond decisively and responsibly to any nuclear emergency must be fully ensured in advance. Experience has shown that the Commission as a whole cannot deal expeditiously with emergencies or communicate in a clear, unified voice to civil authorities or to the public. But present law prevents the Commission from delegating its emergency authority to one of its members. The Plan would correct this situation by specifically authorizing the Chairman to act for the Commission in an emergency. In order to ensure flexibility, the Chairman would be permitted to delegate his authority to deal with a particular emergency to any other Commissioner. Plans for dealing with various contingencies would be approved by the Commission in advance. The Commission would also receive a report from the Chairman or his designee describing the management of the emergency once it was over.

Not included in this Plan are two actions that I support in principle but that need not or cannot be accomplished by means of a Reorganization Plan. First the Commission, as part of its implementation of this reorganization, can and should establish an internal entity to help oversee the performance of the agency as it operates under the Chairman’s direction. This action does not require a Reorganization Plan. Second, I have consistently favored funding assistance to intervenors in regulatory proceedings. This is particularly important in the case of nuclear safety regulation. I therefore encourage the Commission to include consideration of intervenor funding as part of its review and upgrading of the licensing process, as called for by the Kemeny Commission. I have also requested Congress to appropriate funds for this purpose. This activity cannot be authorized by a Reorganization Plan.

This proposed realignment and clarification of responsibilities would not result in an increase or decrease of expenditures. But placing management responsibilities in the Chairman would result in greater attention to developing and implementing nuclear safety policies and to strict enforcement of the terms of licenses granted by the Commission.

Each of the provisions of this proposed reorganization would also accomplish one or more of the purposes set forth in 5 U.S.C. 901(a). No statutory functions would be abolished by the Plan; rather they would be consolidated or reassigned in order to improve management, delivery of services, execution of the law, and overall operational efficiency and effectiveness of the Commission.

By Executive Order No. 12202, dated March 18, 1980 [42 U.S.C. 5848 note], I established a Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee to advise me of progress being made by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the nuclear industry, and others in improving nuclear safety. I am confident that the present Reorganization Plan, together with the other steps that have been or are being taken by this Administration and by others, will greatly advance the goal of nuclear safety. It would permit the Commission and the American people to hold one individual—the Chairman—accountable for implementation of the Commission’s policies through effective management of the Commission staff. Freed of management and administrative details, the Commission could then concentrate on the purpose for which that collegial body was created—to deliberate on the formulation of policy and rules to govern nuclear safety and to decide or oversee disposition of individual cases.

The White House, March 27, 1980.

To the Congress of the United States:

I herewith transmit the following amendments to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, which I sent to the Congress on March 27, 1980.

The amendments to Reorganization Plan No. 1 are consistent with my original intent of strengthening the management of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to improve safety in all of the agency’s activities, while preserving the advantages of the Commission form. The amendments reinforce the purpose of the Plan in two respects. First, the amended Plan gives the Commission a greater role in selection of key program officers of the agency by adding four positions to the list of appointments initiated by the Chairman for the Commission’s advice and consent. These are the Executive Director for Operations, the Director of Inspection and Enforcement, the Director of Nuclear Regulatory Research, and the Director of Standards Development. Each of these positions contributes to nuclear safety regulation, and each performs functions that help determine the policy and performance of the agency.

The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards advises the Commission as a whole. Since its members serve renewable 4-year terms, another amendment provides that a Commission member, as well as the Chairman, can initiate an appointment to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards for approval by the Commission.

As a means to ensure that the flow of information to the Commission will not be restricted, the Plan has been amended to make explicit that the Chairman, and the Executive Director of Operations through the Chairman, shall keep the Commission fully and currently informed.

The second general purpose of the amendments is to provide for more effective management of the agency by making more explicit the responsibilities of the Chairman and the Executive Director for Operations acting under his direction. As amended, the Plan charges the Chairman with planning for the development of policy for consideration and approval by the Commission. In the past, this responsibility has not been clearly fixed and has consequently been neglected. The amended Plan continues to make clear that the Executive Director for Operations reports to the Chairman. An amendment, however, requires the Chairman to delegate to the Executive Director for Operations the authority to appoint the staff and the day-to-day administration of the agency. Under this arrangement, the Chairman retains responsibility for the delegated functions but will be better able to handle his other leadership tasks.

In summary, the amendments I am transmitting to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, based on review and hearings conducted by the Congress and on continued consultations, will help establish a more accountable central management structure for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as it pursues its statutory objective of ensuring safety in the use of nuclear power.

The White House, May 5, 1980.

Ex. Ord. No. 11902, Fespan. 2, 1976, 41 F.R. 4877, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12038, Fespan. 3, 1978, 43 F.R. 4957, which set out procedures for the export licensing policy as to nuclear materials and equipment, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12058, May 11, 1978, 43 F.R. 20947, set out as a note under section 3201 of Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse.

Ex. Ord. No. 14300, May 23, 2025, 90 F.R. 22587, provided:

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1. Purpose. Abundant energy is a vital national- and economic-security interest. In conjunction with domestic fossil fuel production, nuclear energy can liberate America from dependence on geopolitical rivals. It can power not only traditional manufacturing industries but also cutting-edge, energy-intensive industries such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

Between 1954 and 1978, the United States authorized the construction of 133 since-completed civilian nuclear reactors at 81 power plants. Since 1978, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has authorized only a fraction of that number; of these, only two reactors have entered into commercial operation. The NRC charges applicants by the hour to process license applications, with prolonged timelines that maximize fees while throttling nuclear power development. The NRC has failed to license new reactors even as technological advances promise to make nuclear power safer, cheaper, more adaptable, and more abundant than ever.

This failure stems from a fundamental error: Instead of efficiently promoting safe, abundant nuclear energy, the NRC has instead tried to insulate Americans from the most remote risks without appropriate regard for the severe domestic and geopolitical costs of such risk aversion. The NRC utilizes safety models that posit there is no safe threshold of radiation exposure and that harm is directly proportional to the amount of exposure. Those models lack sound scientific basis and produce irrational results, such as requiring that nuclear plants protect against radiation below naturally occurring levels. A myopic policy of minimizing even trivial risks ignores the reality that substitute forms of energy production also carry risk, such as pollution with potentially deleterious health effects.

Recent events in Europe, such as the nationwide blackouts in Spain and Portugal, underscore the importance of my Administration’s focus on dispatchable power generation—including nuclear power—over intermittent power. Beginning today, my Administration will reform the NRC, including its structure, personnel, regulations, and basic operations. In so doing, we will produce lasting American dominance in the global nuclear energy market, create tens of thousands of high-paying jobs, and generate American-led prosperity and resilience.

Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to:

(a) Reestablish the United States as the global leader in nuclear energy;

(span) Facilitate increased deployment of new nuclear reactor technologies, such as Generation III+ and IV reactors, modular reactors, and microreactors, including by lowering regulatory and cost barriers to entry;

(c) Facilitate the expansion of American nuclear energy capacity from approximately 100 GW in 2024 to 400 GW by 2050;

(d) Employ emerging technologies to safely accelerate the modeling, simulation, testing, and approval of new reactor designs;

(e) Support the continued operation of, and facilitate appropriate operational extensions for, the current nuclear fleet, as well as the reactivation of prematurely shuttered or partially completed nuclear facilities; and

(f) Maintain the United States’ leading reputation for nuclear safety.

Sec. 3. Reforming the NRC’s Culture. The Congress has mandated that the NRC’s “licensing and regulation of the civilian use of radioactive materials and nuclear energy be conducted in a manner that is efficient and does not unnecessarily limit—(1) the civilian use of radioactive materials and deployment of nuclear energy; or (2) the benefits of civilian use of radioactive materials and nuclear energy technology to society.” Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024, Public Law 118–67, sec. 501(a) [22 U.S.C. 2201 note]. Just as the Congress directed, the NRC’s mission shall include facilitating nuclear power while ensuring reactor safety. When carrying out its licensing and related regulatory functions, the NRC shall consider the benefits of increased availability of, and innovation in, nuclear power to our economic and national security in addition to safety, health, and environmental considerations.

Sec. 4. Reforming the NRC’s Structure. (a) The current structure and staffing of the NRC are misaligned with the Congress’s directive that the NRC shall not unduly restrict the benefits of nuclear power. The NRC shall, in consultation with the NRC’s DOGE Team (as defined in Executive Order 14158 of January 20, 2025 (Establishing and Implementing the President’s “Department of Government Efficiency”) [5 U.S.C. 305 note]), and consistent with its governing statutes, reorganize the NRC to promote the expeditious processing of license applications and the adoption of innovative technology. The NRC shall undertake reductions in force in conjunction with this reorganization, though certain functions may increase in size consistent with the policies in this order, including those devoted to new reactor licensing. The NRC shall also create a dedicated team of at least 20 officials to draft the new regulations directed by section 5 of this order.

(span) The personnel and functions of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) shall be reduced to the minimum necessary to fulfill ACRS’s statutory obligations. Review by ACRS of permitting and licensing issues shall focus on issues that are truly novel or noteworthy.

Sec. 5. Reforming and Modernizing the NRC’s Regulations. The NRC, working with its DOGE Team, the Office of Management and Budget, and other executive departments and agencies as appropriate, shall undertake a review and wholesale revision of its regulations and guidance documents, and issue notice(s) of proposed rulemaking effecting this revision within 9 months of the date of this order. The NRC shall issue final rules and guidance to conclude this revision process within 18 months of the date of this order [May 23, 2025]. In conducting this wholesale revision, the NRC shall be guided by the policies set forth in section 2 of this order and shall in particular:

(a) Establish fixed deadlines for its evaluation and approval of licenses, license amendments, license renewals, certificates of compliance, power uprates, license transfers, and any other activity requested by a licensee or potential licensee, as directed under the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act [Puspan. L. 115–439, see Tables for classification], rather than the nonbinding “generic milestone schedules” guidelines the NRC has already adopted. Those deadlines shall be enforced by fixed caps on the NRC’s recovery of hourly fees. The deadlines shall include: (1) a deadline of no more than 18 months for final decision on an application to construct and operate a new reactor of any type, commencing with the first required step in the regulatory process, and (2) a deadline of no more than 1 year for final decision on an application to continue operating an existing reactor of any type, commencing with the first required step in the regulatory process. The regulations should not provide for tolling those deadlines except in instances of applicant failure, and must allow a reasonably diligent applicant to navigate the licensing process successfully in the time allotted. Moreover, these are maximum time periods; the NRC shall adopt shorter deadlines tailored to particular reactor types or licensing pathways as appropriate.

(span) Adopt science-based radiation limits. In particular, the NRC shall reconsider reliance on the linear no-threshold (LNT) model for radiation exposure and the “as low as reasonably achievable” standard, which is predicated on LNT. Those models are flawed, as discussed in section 1 of this order. In reconsidering those limits, the NRC shall specifically consider adopting determinate radiation limits, and in doing so shall consult with the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Environmental Protection Agency.

(c) Revise, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality, NRC regulations governing NRC’s compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act [of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.] to reflect the Congress’s 2023 amendments to that statute and the policies articulated in sections 2 and 5 of Executive Order 14154 of January 20, 2025 (Unleashing American Energy) [42 U.S.C. 13201 note].

(d) Establish an expedited pathway to approve reactor designs that the DOD or the DOE have tested and that have demonstrated the ability to function safely. NRC review of such designs shall focus solely on risks that may arise from new applications permitted by NRC licensure, rather than revisiting risks that have already been addressed in the DOE or DOD processes.

(e) Establish a process for high-volume licensing of microreactors and modular reactors, including by allowing for standardized applications and approvals and by considering to what extent such reactors or components thereof should be regulated through general licenses.

(f) Establish stringent thresholds for circumstances in which the NRC may demand changes to reactor design once construction is underway.

(g) Revise the Reactor Oversight Process and reactor security rules and requirements to reduce unnecessary burdens and be responsive to credible risks.

(h) Adopt revised and, where feasible, determinate and data-backed thresholds to ensure that reactor safety assessments focus on credible, realistic risks.

(i) Reconsider the regulations governing the time period for which a renewed license remains effective, and extend that period as appropriate based on available technological and safety data.

(j) Streamline the public hearings process.

Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(span) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall provide funding for publication of this order in the Federal Register.